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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the controversy surrounding the history of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. Since December 7th, 1941, the subject of the Pearl Harbor attack
has been dealt with by various executive branch and military investigations, a
Congressional investigation, the media, historians and foreign governments. Despite the
years of study, the reasons for the success of the attack are still disputed.
The purpose o f this study is to examine the various opinions which have formed the
controversy. It looks at the statements by key administration officials provided in
diaries, memoirs, writings and testimony to the official investigations. It details the
specific allegations made by revisionist writers in their attempt to prove that the
Roosevelt administration was guilty of a conspiracy to allow the Japanese attack to occur.
It compares these attacks to the official statements and to the interpretations of those
who challenged the revisionists.
The paper also studies the factors which allowed the controversy to develop, decline
and revive over the past half century. It looks at how political ambitions, the change in
the political climate and the release o f classified information affected the controversy and
allowed it to continue for so long. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the
controversy and various elements o f it.
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BATTLE OVER PEARL HARBOR
The Controversy Surrounding the Japanese Attack, 1941-1994

INTRODUCTION

On the morning o f December 7th, 1941 the forces o f imperial Japan launched an attack
against the United States at Pearl Harbor. The attack devastated the American forces,
destroying or severely damaging 188 American planes, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3
destroyers and four other vessels. There were also 3,435 American casualties.1 The
following day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked for and received from Congress a
Declaration o f War against Japan. Within a week Germany declared war on the United
States, propelling the nation into a global conflict.
As the shock of the attack wore off, people at all levels o f American society wondered
how the attack could have h happened. There were some questions as to how relations
between the United States and Japan had deteriorated to the point o f war. Other
questions focused on the reasons for the success of the attack. The initial reaction to the
attack was to blame the Japanese. Americans accused warmongers in Japan of pursuing a
policy of conquest, deciding on war and planning the treacherous surprise attack. The
simple view o f Pearl Harbor was that the Japanese were guilty.
Had these held, there would never have been a controversy. Although many people
endeavored to support this view, others repeatedly challenged and revised it over the
years, resulting in more than a half century o f controversy surrounding the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor. Since the days following the bombing, the facts have been shrouded in
secrecy and censorship, a problem that led to doubts about what really transpired. The
early challenges grew out of skepticism over Japan's capabilities. Many Americans did not
believe that the Japanese could have accomplished the feat unless America had deliberately
ignored warnings and allowed the base to remain unprepared. Some people accused the
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administration of planning the attack and even claimed that American pilots flew the
planes. Less radical opinions held that Japan would not risk war with the United States
unless given no other option, thereby implicating the administration’s foreign policy. As
time passed critics held the Roosevelt administration responsible, claiming that the
war could have been prevented by diplomacy and that Roosevelt, wanting war, had
refused to negotiate seriously in order to provoke a Japanese attack. They also accused
Roosevelt of withholding information from the Pearl Harbor commanders and allowing the
Japanese to surprise the fleet in order to get the United States into the war.
Ironically, those who charged that Roosevelt conspired to allow the attack to take
place claimed that his motive had to do with unifying the nation. Conspiracists charged
that Roosevelt put the fleet in Pearl Harbor and lured Japan to strike it in order to shock
the nation into rallying behind the war effort. The disaster did initially rally the nation
against its enemies, but it also became the most divisive issue of the war, one that would
long outlast the administration, the war and most o f those involved.
After fifty-three years o f official and private investigations, there has never been any
direct proof that President Franklin Roosevelt was involved in a conspiracy to
get the United States into World War II. As one writer put it, "The Pearl Harbor record
ends with no signed confessions."2 Nevertheless, the controversy over
Roosevelt's culpability in the Pearl Harbor attack has continued. The clash between the
necessity o f secrecy and the desire for truth provided the impetus for the debate.
Political ambitions, struggles for control over the direction o f American foreign policy and
the classification and release o f relevant information sustained the Pearl Harbor debate
and allowed it to become a major part o f the history o f the second World War. The
history o f the controversy is a tale which reveals both the political effects of withholding
information in America and the vigorous struggles to discover or manipulate the truth.
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MAGIC
Before going into the development o f the controversy, it is important to understand
one o f the biggest sources o f the controversy, Magic. This was the name given to the
intelligence derived from the decrypted Japanese messages.
American code breakers had been working on deciphering other countries' codes since
World War I. Primarily, this consisted o f intercepting radio traffic and decrypting the
messages. Under the leadership of Herbert Yardley, the Black Chamber (the name given
to the codebreaking agency which was funded by both the State Department and Military
Intelligence) broke the Japanese diplomatic code prior to the Washington Naval
Conference o f 1921-1922. The intelligence gained from the decrypts o f messages sent
from Japan to their representatives at the conference gave the United States a great
advantage in the negotiations.3 Although Yardley's group was shut down under the
Hoover administration, codebreaking continued under the newly formed Signal
Intelligence Service (SIS) of the U. S. Army. This was led by William F. Friedman and
concentrated on breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes. The United States Navy had its
own codebreaking unit called OP-20-G which was originally led by Lt. Lawrence F.
Safford, who was again in charge at the time o f the Pearl Harbor attack.4
The Japanese diplomatic code was enciphered using a machine. In order to transmit
Japanese messages over commercial airwaves the Japanese used kana. This expressed
the Japanese syllabary in ideographs which represented the Japanese and Chinese sounds.
These ideographs were then romanized in order to be printed out by western typewriters.5
The enciphering machine had a typewriter keyboard by which the message was entered in
kana. Using a system of telephone exchange stepping switches, it enciphered the
message, which was then printed out by a second typewriter. The value o f the machine
was that it had millions o f possible combinations.6
By 1936, the United States was able to read Japanese diplomatic messages on a regular
basis. However, the Japanese implemented the new code machine in 1939 which
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Friedman named "Purple." Fortunately for the American codebreakers, the Japanese were
unable to switch to the new machine all at once. For a brief period o f time, some
embassies did not have the new machine, which meant that messages were being sent
using both the old and new code. Using clues given from the two sets o f messages,
Friedman and his team were able to build their own Purple machine by midSeptember, 1940.7 The United States could again read the Japanese messages sent to and
from their embassies and consulates around the world. This gave the United States
some knowledge o f the advice the ambassadors were receiving and the information Tokyo
was seeking, thus providing a clue to Japanese intentions. America had also broken other
diplomatic codes and could predict to some degree the location of the Japanese naval
ships through radio traffic analysis.8
Although the United States could read the Japanese messages, this did not give them
complete knowledge of Japanese plans. There were certain limitations. Because it
was the diplomatic code that they had broken, it meant that they could read the Japanese
Foreign Ministry messages, not the military messages. (The controversy over whether the
United States had broken the Japanese Naval code prior to Pearl Harbor will be discussed
in chapter four.) There was also a limited number o f machines. By 1941 only eight Purple
machines had been built; four were in Washington, one was in the Philippines and three
had been given to the British. The commanders in Hawaii did not have one. The lack of
machines made it difficult to decrypt the large volume o f messages being intercepted.
Other factors included the few people involved in processing the information and the lack
o f people in intelligence who could translate Japanese. The codebreakers were also
hindered by transmission and translation errors.9
Secrecy played an important role in hampering the use o f Magic. The decrypts were
shown only to a select group of people: the President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary o f War, the Secretary o f Navy, the Chief o f Naval Operations, the Army Chief
of Staff and a handful o f other high ranking army and naval officers. For the first four

6
months, Roosevelt and Secretary o f State Hull were actually denied the information and
did not begin receiving Magic until January of 1941.10 Because o f the value o f the
information, the administration was very careful to keep it secret. In planning actions
based on information from the decrypts, it was afraid that the Japanese would deduce that
America had broken the code. The military was particularly wary of sending information
to Hawaii due to the number of Japanese natives living in the islands.11 Thus, although
Magic provided important information, it also restricted the actions that could be taken in
response to the information.
During the war, the government never revealed that it had broken the Japanese codes,
because it was getting its most valuable intelligence information from its codebreaking
operations. However, Congress and the press did uncover some hints that the United
States had been reading Japanese messages before Pearl Harbor. This was what sparked
the controversy over Pearl Harbor in 1944 and 1945. When the actual decrypts were
released to Congress after the war, the controversy flourished. Many historians looking at
the messages insisted that the administration must have known that the Japanese were
going to attack, and thus began piecing together the conspiracy theories.

The Information
One important piece of information which the U. S. intelligence intercepted was the
series of messages which later became known as the "bomb plot messages." The correct
analysis o f these messages would have pointed out that Japan was seeking information on
targets to bomb. On September 14, 1941, Tokyo sent a message to the Japanese
consulate in Honolulu labeled "strictly secret." It requested the consulate to make reports
on vessels in Hawaii and commanded that "the waters [of Pearl Harbor] are to be divided
rightly into sub areas." The dispatch stipulated that Tokyo's need for information on
warships and aircraft carriers "at anchor, tied up at wharfs, buoys and in docks" and

7
stressed the importance of types and classes of the ships.12 On November 15th, Tokyo
sent another message which said:
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate o f twice per week.
Although you are already no doubt aware, please take extra care
to maintain secrecy.13
Three days later the Japanese consulate transmitted information to Tokyo describing
which ships were in each sub area. It also provided facts on destroyers entering the
harbor, including the course and speed o f the ships. On November 29th, Tokyo further
requested that the consulate report even when there were no ship movements.14 Other
more detailed messages were intercepted but not translated until after December 7th.
Although many who studied the messages after the war claimed that they provided
direct evidence o f Japanese intentions on Pearl Harbor, it may not have been so clear.
There were also numerous messages asking for information concerning American ships in
the Philippines, Panama, the Far East and in the United States.
Another series of dispatches that hinted at future conflict dealt with a deadline for
diplomatic action. In the fall o f 1941, Japanese and American diplomats attempted to
reach an agreement between the two countries which would prevent war. The
negotiations were unsuccessful. However, while they were still going on, there were a
number of messages sent from Tokyo to Washington, using the Purple code, that urged
the diplomats in Washington to move quickly. On November 5, the Japanese government
told its ambassador in Washington that "it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for
the signing o f this agreement are to be completed by the 25th o f this month."15 Six days
later the 25th was confirmed as a "definite deadline." The message also noted that
America seemed "still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation
here."16
Probably the most poignant message in this series was sent from Tokyo on November
22. It said:
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There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle
Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or
four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans, if the
signing can be completed by the 29th ... we have decided to wait until that
date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely
cannot be
changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.17
After this message, the situation began to decline rapidly. On November 28th, Tokyo
sent a message praising the "superhuman effort" of the ambassadors and calling the U. S.
proposal "humiliating." Although Tokyo conceded that negotiations were to end in a few
days, it asked the diplomats to keep up the appearance o f negotiation.18 Two days later,
Japan warned its embassy in Berlin that war could "break out between the Anglo-Saxon
Nations and Japan ... quicker than anyone dreams."19 On December first and second,
messages were sent to embassies in many countries to destroy the code machines and
secret documents.20
The most important intercepted dispatch was the fourteen part message sent from
Tokyo to Washington on December 6th, 1941. As previously mentioned, negotiations
were going on between both countries. In November, the Japanese had made a proposal.
The Americans had made a counter proposal on November 26 that Japan had seen as an
ultimatum. The fourteen part message was in response to that proposal. The
ambassadors were to give this response to the Secretary of State. Translated in
Washington on the sixth, the first thirteen parts certainly pointed to a deterioration in
relations between the two countries. The communique began by defending the Japanese
policies and interests in China. It outlined the steps taken to reach an accord with the
United States proclaiming Japan's "attitude of fairness and moderation." Tokyo listed a
series o f charges against America including: "seeking for the extension of the war,"
wanting to "maintain ... its dominant position in China and the Far East" and making "a
proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the
Japanese Government."21 Roosevelt received the translation of the message from the
American intelligence staff on December 6th. Roosevelt's confidant, Harry Hopkins, was

9
with the President at the time. According to the officer who delivered the message, after
reading the translation, Roosevelt told Hopkins, "This means war."22 Thus, on eve of
the attack, the U. S. had some evidence that war was about to break out.
The following morning the last part of the message was translated. It stated:
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view o f the attitude o f the American Government it
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations.23
Following this came another message directing the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the
Secretary of State at exactly 1:00 P.M. on the seventh o f December, Washington time.
The next message thanked the ambassadors for their efforts and prayed for their health.24
Thus, during the morning o f December 7th, 1941, American leaders knew that Japan had
decided to break diplomatic relations at a specific time: 1:00 P.M. of that day.
There were other pieces of information, as well as specific actions or lack o f actions,
that contributed to the controversy and they will be discussed later in the paper. However,
the Magic information made the most significant contribution to the controversy, first
because the messages could not be made public and later because they were made
public and interpreted with the benefit of hindsight by those who doubted the honesty and
motives of the administration.

CHAPTER I
POLITICS AND SECRETS

Although the Congressional Investigating Committee, which revealed the controversial
Magic decrypts, did not meet until after the war, the controversy itself began in the
immediate aftermath o f the attack on Pearl Harbor. One o f the key factors contributing to
the dissension during the war years was politics. Republicans and other opponents o f
President Roosevelt criticized his administration for the disaster and continued to search
for information which would demonstrate his culpability. In Congress, Republicans
persisted in attacking the explanations provided by the executive branch and charged it
with not revealing all the facts. To some extent this was unfair to the administration,
because in the interests o f national security, it could not reveal that it had broken the
Japanese code. However, it is difficult to determine where the interests of national
security ended and the desire to conceal mistakes began. Despite the motive, the result
was the same. Lack of information allowed critics of the administration to make serious
allegations which went unanswered but generated considerable coverage in the press.
The initial reactions to the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor were ones o f shock and
outrage combined with calls for support o f the war effort. Many o f the news editorials on
the day after the attack were jingoistic accounts praising the efforts o f Roosevelt and
calling for all efforts to meet the enemy. Some called for silencing the voice o f disunity,
and one promoted striking "with all our might to protect and preserve the American
freedom that we hold dear."1 Even some o f the isolationists urged an attack on Japan.
The America First Committee and labor leaders called for complete support for the war
effort. House Republican leader, Joseph Martin, declared that party lines were out for the
10
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rest o f the war.2

Although there was generally a flood o f support for the President, the

seeds of controversy could be detected in the early hours o f the war. One source of
criticism was the isolationist movement. Contrary to later years, American isolationism in
1941 was a strong political trend. A very significant portion o f the population believed
that American prosperity was contingent on America remaining isolated from the affairs
and conflicts o f the European and Asian nations. Led by individuals such as Senator
Gerald Nye and Robert McCormick, the publisher o f The Chicago Tribune, the
isolationists were a very vocal political force. Many were members o f the Republican
party who not only resisted interventionism but also resented Roosevelt's domestic
reforms. In the years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the isolationists had successfully
hampered Roosevelt's intention to assist the British and resist the Germans. However, the
Japanese attack effectively eroded the influence of the isolationists and thus exacerbated
their suspicions o f the event.
Senator Gerald Nye, one o f the leading isolationists, received word o f the attack
minutes before he was to address an isolationist crowd in Pittsburgh. Remarking, "It
sounds fishy to me", Nye went on with his anti-war speech. Later he made charges
against both the President and the British for maneuvering the United States into the war.3
Montana representative Jeannette Rankin, the sole dissenter in the vote for the Declaration
o f War, was overheard muttering, "This might be a Roosevelt trick. How do we know
Pearl Harbor has been bombed?" John Flynn and Charles Lindbergh refused to comment.4
Once the anger over the attack had begun to subside, most people were perplexed as to
how it could have occurred. Many refused to believe that the Japanese were capable o f
succeeding at such a complicated endeavor. The Chicago Tribune spread a rumor that
German pilots had flown the planes and that many of the planes had swastikas.5 Another
popular belief was that the American officers had all been drunk the night before.6
Congress and the press also speculated on the attack. Some may have just wanted to
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know why it happened, while others were probably intent on causing problems for the
administration.7
One factor which facilitated speculation both during the war and in the decades since
was the withholding of information by the government. This began in 1941 with the
dearth o f information released by the White House. Although Secretary of Navy, Frank
Knox, had left for Hawaii on December 10th and returned to D. C. on the fourteenth, the
government was not releasing many facts. The first reports said that the U. S. had lost
only one battleship, three destroyers and a target ship, the Utah. Tokyo radio claimed
that the damage was more severe. Although most Americans believed the Japanese claims
to be mere propaganda, Japan was closer to the truth.8 Knox feared that if the American
people knew the extent of the damage, "they would panic and the war would be over
before we get into it."9 Other officials advised the President that it would be a mistake to
publicize the details as that would let the Japanese know how badly the fleet had been
hurt.10 Thus, even from the beginning the government felt it had to hide information from
the public in the interests o f national security. A poll taken in January, 1942 revealed that
61% o f Americans thought that important information was being concealed. However, in
a separate 1942 poll, taken after the details of the damage were revealed, 73% o f those
polled agreed with the navy for withholding the information.11 Nevertheless, at the time
the lack o f detailed impelled people to question and to suspect the official account.
On December 17th, 1941 the President announced the members o f a five man
commission set up to investigate the attack. Justice Owen Roberts, who had been the
special prosecutor in the Tea Pot Dome Scandal, was selected to lead the commission,
which also included two generals and two admirals.12 This group limited its
investigations primarily to what had happened in Hawaii. It concluded that Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short, the ranking military officers in Hawaii,
were guilty o f dereliction of duty. The Commission said that Kimmel and Short were
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notified in dispatches from Washington o f the danger of the situation in the weeks prior to
attack. Kimmel and Short were found guilty o f failure to take the steps necessary to
meet that situation. The top officials in Washington were held blameless.15
As far as the administration was concerned, the Roberts Commission should have
ended the clamor over Pearl Harbor; instead it caused more disputes. The Republicans in
Congress called for more investigations, asserting that the Roberts Commission was
covering up for the administration and using Kimmel and Short as scapegoats. They
blamed Washington for not giving sufficient warnings to Hawaii.14 Members o f the
press also called for further investigations. Owen Villard, writing in Current History,
wanted the government to provide more information on unified commands, why the War
Department did not react when General Short implemented an alert for sabotage as
opposed to one for air attack and why the messages to Hawaii had been so vague.15 The
New York Times blamed Washington for failing to ensure cooperation among the
commands and criticized the American public for its prewar attitude.16
The administration was not completely satisfied with the report either. Writing in his
diary, Secretary o f War Henry Stimson criticized the report for not getting to the real
truth of what happened. Stimson wrote that the primary mistake was in not learning the
"lessons o f the development o f the airplane in respect to the defense o f a navy and a
naval base,"17 Roosevelt added to the uproar by suggesting that Kimmel and Short would
not be court-martialed. The Roberts Commission had singled those two out for
responsibility, and Congress wanted blood. This raised doubts about whether or not the
administration was telling the truth.18 O f course, the administration was not telling
the whole truth. The Roberts Commission Report made no mention of Magic. In fact, the
commission was denied access to Magic, given only some of the information derived from
the codebreaking activities and not informed that the Pacific commanders had lacked much
of the information that the leaders in Washington had held from them.19 The
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administration hoped the issue would fade, realizing a court-martial would only reveal
information about its codebreaking activities.
The debate did cool for a while in 1942 and 1943, although there were two
publications that stirred criticism. The first o f these was, How War Came the American
White Paper: From the Fall o f France to Pearl Harbor by Forest Davis and Ernest K.
Lindley. Although the authors intended to support the administration and the official
thesis on the war origins, they revealed certain information concerning the prewar actions
o f the administration which led to criticism. In particular the references to the strength of
prewar Anglo- American ties as well as administration considerations of a possible
Japanese attack. The authors wrote that the administration was perplexed as to how to
get the United States into the war without a direct Japanese attack. Davis and Lindley
intended to set up an argument that would condemn the isolationists for hampering
American prewar planning. However, the comments about relations with Japan reinforced
the isolationist attack on the administration's motives and actions.20
Further fuel for the isolationist fire came in the State Department's own version of the
actions taken prior to Pearl Harbor. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy,
1931- 1941 was released to the public on January 2, 1943. Previously, the accepted notion
was that the U. S. had been surprised by the attack, because at the time it was conducting
negotiations aimed at maintaining peace. The State Department report revealed that as
early as November 29 Secretary of State Hull thought that diplomacy had failed and
the situation had become the responsibility of the army and navy. He had also warned of
the possibility o f a surprise attack. The critics wondered how the administration could
have been surprised having been alert to the gravity of the situation.21
The influence of politics increased as the debate shifted back to Congress in the fall of
1943. Martin Melosi in The Shadow o f Pearl Harbor attributed this at least partly to the
election of 1942 in which the Republicans gained a number of seats in both the House and
Senate. The context of the debate was the expiration of the Statute o f Limitations for
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prosecuting Kimmel and Short, which was to occur on December 7th, 1943. The
administration did not want a trial for fear that it would interfere with the war effort. The
two main problems with a trial were that it would require testimony from officials who
were busy fighting the war and that it might reveal information about Magic.22 The
military decided to waive the Statute o f limitations and promised to proceed with the trial
at the earliest appropriate time 23
In early December, Congress decided to interfere. Some Congressmen called for the
immediate trial of the Hawaiian commanders. Others openly questioned why the officers
were not free to tell their story. Rather than accepting the administration's excuse, many
critics believed that the administration was trying to hide something or protect someone.
In the end, Congress passed a resolution extending the statute o f limitations for another
six months, to June 7, 1944 24
By May o f 1944, with the deadline for a trial looming, neither Kimmel nor Short had
yet been brought to trial and the allegations resumed. Kimmel himself was asking for
an open court-martial, which he believed would vindicate him. Arthur Krock, a New York
Times columnist, exacerbated the situation in a May 31 article in which he raised a number
o f questions which he claimed the administration had never properly answered. He
questioned why the fleet had been placed in Hawaii instead of California, why it was in the
harbor during a crisis, why Washington had not ordered Short to implement the correct
type o f alert and why the military had not responded to the intelligence supplied by the
State Department.25
Congress decided to extend the statute o f limitations for Pearl Harbor trials for another
six months and directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary o f Navy to conduct
investigations into what happened. Partisan politics certainly influenced the debate over
the resolution. Some Representatives called for war unity and accused the Republicans o f
trying to undermine the war effort. Hamilton Fish, a New York Republican, defended his
party from these attacks and charged the administration with postponing the trial for fear
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that it would uncover evidence pointing to the culpability of administration officials.26 In
the Senate, Homer Ferguson (Republican, Michigan) claimed that the facts had not all
been available at the time o f the Roberts Commission. Senator Hendrick Shipstead
(Republican, Minnesota) stirred even more commotion by bringing up references to
prewar communications and promises between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.27

The Election of 1944
The political influence on the Pearl Harbor controversy was best illustrated by the
actions o f both parties in relation to the Presidential election o f 1944. The Republicans
faced a difficult prospect in trying to defeat an incumbent in the middle o f a war. There
was no way to avoid the war in the campaign, since it was the overwhelming issue in
America. The problem for the Republicans was that America was winning the war, and
they had to be careful not to appear disloyal or unpatriotic in opposing Roosevelt's
policies. Their aim was to convince the American public that they offered a better foreign
policy plan as well as a better domestic policy. However, most Americans were satisfied
with the administration's handling o f the war.
The Republicans needed an issue that would make Roosevelt look weak on foreign
policy; Pearl Harbor became that issue. The Republicans developed a strategy based on
attacking the President for how he got the United States into the war, hoping to show that
he had made major mistakes.28 Republican Congressmen found ammunition for their
attack in the summer o f 1944 while serving on military and naval affairs committees where
some o f the Pearl Harbor secrets were revealed. Word leaked out that if the hidden facts
were known, they would portray a very different view of Roosevelt's handling of foreign
policy.29
Although Pearl Harbor did become a campaign issue, ironically it was not the
Republicans who originally raised it. Missouri Senator and Democratic Vice-Presidential
nominee, Harry Truman, addressed the issue in an article he wrote for Collier's in the
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summer o f 1944. Truman blamed the Pearl Harbor disaster on the lack o f cooperation
between the army and navy and hinted that the fault lay specifically with the lack of
cooperation between Kimmel and Short. Kimmel responded to Truman in a letter that
was entered into the Congressional Record on August 21st, 1944. He wrote:
The real story o f the Pearl Harbor attack and the events preceding it has
never been publicly told. ..For more than two and a half years I have been
anxious to have the American people know all the facts.30
Truman attacked back, declaring that everything he wrote in his report was true and
that a court-martial would prove it.31 Truman intended to defend the administration, but
instead allowed the Republicans an opening to exploit the issue.
Congress was once again the arena for the dispute. Republican Ralph Church (Illinois)
claimed that the full story would "shock the world," that Washington was guilty and the
report o f the Roberts Commission was a political document.32 On August 25th,
Republican Representative Warren G. Magnuson (Washington) gave information about
rumors he had heard were spreading on the west coast. According to the rumors, the
Japanese had made a deal with the United States so that the latter would stop naval and
aerial patrols in the Central Pacific in the fall of 1941. Magnuson blamed the State
Department for accepting the Japanese proposal and "bottling up the fleet in Pearl
Harbor." The State Department denied the rumor on the following day.33
On August 30th, Clarence B. Kellard, a member o f the Republican National
Committee, blamed the disaster on Roosevelt. He asserted that the President's mistakes
had led to a longer war and more deaths. He urged people to vote for Republican
candidate, Thomas E. Dewey, to put foreign policy making authority into the hands of "a
courageous President belonging to the party which alone has announced a coherent
foreign policy and post-war plan."34
House Republicans continued the attack, accusing Roosevelt o f withholding the real
story for political reasons. They claimed they were pressing the issue in order to allow the

18
public to accurately judge the ability of the President to maintain peace and prevent war.
Representative Francis Case of South Dakota summed up the Republican motive for
making the disaster a political issue. Case claimed that the public needed the real story,
because if the President was re-elected, it would be on the understanding that only he
could manage the war and make the peace.35 The Republicans wanted the American
people to see that he could not.
In the Senate, Republicans Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania) and Forest Harness (Indiana)
brought new charges against the administration. They announced that the Australians had
warned Washington seventy-two hours before the attack that a Japanese fleet was heading
toward Hawaii. Republican Representative Church added to the attack by reading a letter
from a Mr. Sydney Graves, a resident o f Washington. Graves said he had overheard the
Australian Foreign Minister, Sir Owen Dixon, remark at a party that his country had
picked up the Japanese fleet heading toward America and had warned America. Sir Owen
Dixon denied the claim.36

House Majority leader, Democrat John McCormack of

Massachusetts denied the Australian rumor and claimed that the Republicans were just
trying to erode the public's confidence in the President. The Australian Prime Minister,
John Curtin termed the rumors "pure invention."37 Roosevelt tried to dismiss the claims,
saying that anyone who had information should present it to the army and navy
investigators. He also said, "Lots o f stories of that sort would be heard morning, noon
and night until November 7th (election day)."38
The Republican candidate, New York Governor Thomas Dewey, also brought up the
issue in September, 1944 but abruptly and somewhat mysteriously did not continue. The
story behind his actions is a clear example o f politics and secrecy becoming entangled.
General George Marshall, the Army Chief o f Staff, heard that Dewey had learned about
the breaking o f the diplomatic code and was planning to reveal it during the campaign.
Marshall conferred with Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief o f Naval Operations and
decided to send a letter to Dewey. Marshall knew that the United States was still
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gathering important information from the diplomatic messages and wanted to preserve
that source from becoming a political casualty.39
Marshall sent Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke to meet with Governor Dewey in
Tulsa, Oklahoma on September 26. He delivered a letter from Marshall to Dewey that
was marked "top secret." Dewey read the first two paragraphs which warned him o f the
secrecy involved in the rest of the letter. After questioning Clarke, he decided not to read
further, refusing to "seal his lips on things he already knew about Pearl Harbor" or might
find out later.40 Dewey claimed he knew all about America's reading o f certain codes
before the war and stated that Roosevelt "ought to be impeached" for knowing what was
happening before the attack and not preventing it. He gave the letter back to Clarke but
offered to meet with him in Albany the following week.41
Marshall sent Clarke to Albany to meet with Dewey on the 28th with a new letter.
Governor Dewey only agreed to read the letter if he could show it to his advisor, Mr.
Elliott Bell, and keep the letter in his safe. He also claimed that he did not understand why
it was so secret since "This code business is the worst kept secret in Washington."42
Dewey could not believe that the Japanese had not changed their codes. However, he did
telephone Marshall, and Marshall agreed to allow Dewey to show the letter to Bell and
keep it in his safe.
Both Dewey and Bell read the letter and asked Clarke a number o f questions.
According to Clarke, Dewey mentioned that he did not realize that the Japanese were still
using the codes mentioned in the letter 43 Marshall’s letter reported how they were still
obtaining information from the diplomatic code about enemy activities in both the Pacific
and Europe. America's best information about German activities was coming from the
intercepted messages sent by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin. Marshall also explained
how revealing the codebreaking activities would threaten relations with America's allies
who were very wary of sharing secrets with America.44 Clarke testified that after he had
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answered a number o f questions, Dewey commented, "I suppose that may be the real
reason for taking no action on the Pearl Harbor warnings they had —they could not
interpret the warnings."45
The important point about this episode between Marshall and Dewey is that it defended
the administration's secrecy in regards to Pearl Harbor. After discovering what the
administration knew, Dewey still refrained from raising the issue. O f course, the governor
probably also realized that revealing the secrets could backfire on him. At a time when
the war was going well, he may have appeared unpatriotic or worse if the revelations
proved detrimental to the war effort. Without exposing the information, he had to retreat
from using the Pearl Harbor issue in the campaign.46 After the election, The New York
Times reported that Dewey had received special information during the campaign but did
not reveal it due to its importance to the war effort47

The Army and Navy Investigations
The investigations which Congress had called for in June o f 1944 continued their work
into the fall, the Naval Court o f Inquiry finishing its examinations on September 27 and the
Army Pearl Harbor Board finishing on October 6. The results were not announced until
December, which provoked some charges that damaging information was being kept
secret until after the election.48 Even in December, Secretary o f War Henry L. Stimson
and Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal refused to release the full reports, claiming that
publication would impede the war effort. However, they did announce that Kimmel and
Short had been cleared o f most o f the accusations, and neither would have to face a
court-martial.49
Only after the war were the reports released, although without revealing any references
to Magic. The two investigations contradicted the Roberts Commission. The Army
Board blamed the Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, for failing to fulfill his duty to
keep Short fully aware o f the severity o f the situation. It also criticized Marshall for
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not keeping Short informed o f what precautions were necessary. Short had been taking
actions to prevent sabotage instead o f aerial attack, but Marshall had never commanded
Short to do otherwise. The Naval Court of Inquiry cleared Admiral Kimmel of blame.
Instead, it found that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, was guilty o f
failure to transmit the vital information pertaining to the break with Japan.50
Around the same time the results of two other investigations were being revealed. The
Hewitt Inquiry and the Clausen Investigation reversed the blame back to the base
commanders, citing KImmel and Short for failure of judgement. The Hewitt Inquiry was
established by Secretary Forrestal in 1945, because he felt that previous investigations had
not uncovered everything. Admiral H. Kent Hewitt led this investigation which
exonerated General Marshall, approving his efforts in the weeks prior to December 7 and
finding Short guilty of not acting on the information received. The Hewitt Inquiry
stressed the limitations on the intelligence information which the government received
from decoded diplomatic dispatches of the enemy. The Clausen Investigation was
conducted by Major Henry Clausen. On Stimson’s orders, Clausen traveled around the
world to further investigate the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Clausen
took affidavits from 92 people and came to the same general conclusions as the Hewitt
Inquiry had.51

The Congressional Investigation
By the fall o f 1945, the American people did not know whom to blame for the debacle.
A poll found that more people (17%) thought the government was responsible than
accused Kimmel and Short (10%), but opinions varied. A majority (55%) o f those polled
thought that Congress should investigate the matter further.52 Congress formed the Joint
Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Comprised of
six Democrats and four Republicans, this Committee met from November 15, 1945 to
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May 31, 1946. In addition to the findings of the previous investigations, the Joint
Committee examined forty-three witnesses and took thousands o f pages of testimony.53
On November 12th, Time predicted the Congressional inquiry would be "shot through
with politics —on both sides."54 The prediction proved correct. Republicans and
Democrats badgered witnesses in the effort to uncover information which would either
prove Roosevelt's guilt or exonerate him. After seven days o f questioning General
Marshall, William D. Mitchell, counsel for the Committee, announced that he and his
assistants were quitting since the work was going to drag long past the deadline which
Congress had set. Time reported that Senator Homer Ferguson, "still looking for evidence
that Franklin Roosevelt had war- mongered, took up nine and a half hours of Marshall's
time."55 In the end the Committee split over its conclusions. Six Democrats as well as
the Republican Representatives, Beartrand Gearhart and Frank B. Keefe, formed the
Majority opinion while Republican Senators Owen Brewster and Homer Ferguson
dissented and published separate conclusions.
The Majority concluded that Japan deserved most of the blame for the attack,
condemning Japan's aggressive policy, duplicity and treacherous actions. It exonerated
the diplomatic actions o f the United States and found no justification in those actions for
Japan to attack. The majority actually praised Roosevelt for making every effort to avert
war. They blamed the Army and Navy for not being prepared, charging Kimmel and Short
with making errors in judgement by not noting the significance o f the information which
they had received. The War Department was held accountable for its failure to correctly
interpret the intelligence it had and take decisive action within time.56
The critics o f the administration remained highly skeptical of the Congressional
investigation and the Majority Report o f the Joint Committee. One critic, Admiral Robert
Theobald claimed that the Democrats in Congress were part of the effort to cover up the
involvement of President Roosevelt. He stated:
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There can be no doubt that many members o f Congress knew or strongly
suspected that the full Pearl Harbor story would intimately involve the
Nation's Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt. The Democratic
majority on the Joint Committee recognized that this would have a strongly
adverse effect upon their party's future fortunes. Consequently, their
strategy was to bury the true Pearl Harbor story under a mass of
evidence that would forever preserve its secret.57
Theobald and others accused the Democrats of failing to press the key witnesses to clarify
statements.
In opposition to the majority opinion, the Minority Report was very critical of the
administration. This report stated the views o f Senators Ferguson and Brewster who
charged the President with knowing that war was imminent and waiting for the enemy to
fire the first shot. Furthermore, they found that the President had intelligence information
disclosing Japanese war intentions and felt that the President and his advisors should have
foreseen that the target was Hawaii. They criticized the President for not ensuring that
American commanders in Hawaii were properly warned of and supplied for an attack by
Japan. They also denounced Roosevelt for not informing Congress and the American
people o f the dangers that the nation faced.58
Due to political divisions, the Congressional Investigation did not provide the definitive
answers to the questions surrounding Pearl Harbor. The Republicans were successful in
illuminating certain administration failures and revealing more about Roosevelt's foreign
policies. However, neither side obtained everything it wanted. The Republicans could not
place all the blame on Roosevelt and his policies, but the Democrats could not thwart
doubts about the actions of the administration. Although Senator Brewster threatened a
second investigation if the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1946, this never
materialized.59
Congress had reached its conclusions; however, the controversy was not settled. The
Joint Committee assured the continuation of the debate by publishing the hearings and its
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findings. The multiple volumes of information included reports of the previous
investigations, testimony of key witnesses and important documents. Also contained in
this were the transcripts o f the secret Japanese messages which the American government
had intercepted and decoded prior to the attack. This information, covert for so long, had
finally been revealed, but the information was not completely clear. Various
interpretations o f the evidence, particularly the Magic decrypts and testimony of key
officials, spurred a long series o f private inquiries which extended the controversy long
after the war. Instead of laying to rest all the suspicions and doubt which had developed
in the years of political attacks and unaswered questions, the information revealed by the
Congressional investigation gave sustenance to these suspicions.

CHAPTER H
HOW TO REM EM BER PEARL HARBOR

As the Pearl Harbor controversy moved from Congress to the historians, the nature of
the investigation transformed from a politically motivated attempt to assess blame to a
wider debate over America's foreign policy. The debate over the attack on Pearl Harbor
continued, because people on both sides o f the issue saw the political utility of convincing
others that their interpretation was correct. Added to this were the details, made public
during the Congressional investigation, which provided enough evidence for skeptical
minds to suspect a conspiracy.
Senators Ferguson and Brewster criticized President Roosevelt for his failures;
however, in the decade after the war the critics were adamant in their conviction that
Roosevelt had not failed. Revisionists, such as Henry Elmer Barnes, Charles Beard,
George Morgenstem, Percy Greaves and Charles Tansill as well as Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel and Robert Theobald, charged that Roosevelt understood the nature of the
Japanese threat and knew that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor. Rather than accusing
him of failure to take the proper steps necessary for adequate preparation, they claimed he
deliberately withheld information from the base commanders and the American people in
order to ensure that the Japanese did attack. According to the conspiracy theorists,
Roosevelt had one main purpose; he wanted the United States to join in the war against
the axis powers but only with the full support of the American people. They claimed that
Roosevelt could only guarantee American support if the enemy successfully attacked the
United States.
25
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This theory gained popularity in the decade after the war due to the efforts of two
groups: the revisionist historians and the defenders o f Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who
had been the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at the time o f attack and received most of
the initial blame. The first of these groups held a more extensive goal, that of reversing
the trend toward interventionism in American foreign policy.
In his book, Roosevelt, M unich to Pearl Harbor, published in 1950, historian Basil
Rauch claimed that the chief lesson Roosevelt learned from Pearl Harbor was "the lesson
of internationalism."1 This idea lay at the core o f the imbroglio. America had turned to an
interventionist, global foreign policy which included alliances, the United Nations, the
Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the Korean War. However, in the forties and
fifties not everyone agreed with this policy and many were not willing to allow its
continuation without protest. Barnes and Beard had been isolationists before the war and
had maintained their views throughout the war. They and other revisionists challenged
interventionism and what they deemed were the lies created by the "court historians" to
justify it.
One great obstacle the revisionists faced was the increasingly popular belief that
America's entry into the war had been for the best, an event that saved the world and made
America great. The isolationist movement was far less significant in the post war period
than it had been before the war. Post-war popular opinion dismissed the isolationist
notion that America could have avoided the war and held that America lacked any choice
other than war in 1941. Americans praised Roosevelt for his farsightedness that had
prepared America for the war and the leadership which ensured a victory. It was popular
to believe that the U.S. had preserved humanity and strengthened the United States. The
revisionists called this "court history" and felt that the correct interpretation o f the Pearl
Harbor episode would be vital to the removal of this paradigm.
The revisionists, rather than accepting and praising America's involvement in the war,
insisted that America could have remained isolated from the conflict. They emphasized
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that neutrality would have resulted in a stronger America and a better world situation than
America's intervention had caused. Barnes claimed that "the rise of Communism, military
state capitalism, the police state, the impending doom of civilization" were all the results
o f U. S. "meddling abroad in situations which did not materially affect our security or
prestige."2 Weighing the results against the deaths, the wounded, the missing and the
billions of dollars spent on the war, Barnes concluded that America would have been
better off if it had "remained aloof."3 Supporting their belief that war could and should
have been avoided, the revisionists attacked Roosevelt and his administration for taking
actions that led America into the war. In their eyes Pearl Harbor was only the culmination
o f Roosevelt's covert efforts to involve the United States in foreign wars. Examining the
volumes of information about Pearl Harbor, the revisionists saw an opportunity to reveal
Roosevelt's duplicity and with that convince America that wars and interventionist policies
were avoidable.
In the decade after the war, there were a number o f writers who sought to rewrite the
history o f Pearl Harbor and the years before it. George Morgenstem who had contributed
to many o f the isolationist editorials o f the Chicago Tribune authored Pearl Harbor: The
Story o f the Secret War, which was published in 1947. He accused Roosevelt o f working
to precipitate a war with Japan as a means of entering the war against Germany.4 Charles
Beard followed a year later with President Roosevelt and the Coming o f the War, 1941.
Beard compared the stated policies o f the Roosevelt administration with what he
considered to be the reality, that Roosevelt was actually pushing Japan into the war.
Beard also detailed the attempts by the administration to cover its actions relating to Pearl
Harbor. Charles TansilTs Backdoor to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941,
published in 1952, expanded that attack on the former President's foreign agenda. He
traced Roosevelt's interventionist efforts as well as what he considered missed
opportunities reaching back into the early nineteen thirties. The following year, Henry
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Elmer Barnes edited a collection of revisionist essays, entitled Perpetual Warfo r
Perpetual Peace, which explored these same themes.5
These four writers, as well as William Neumann, Percy Greaves and William Henry
Chamberlain, put forth the basic revisionist judgement of Franklin Roosevelt. They
argued that national security had not been threatened by the Axis powers but that
Roosevelt for political and personal ends wanted America involved in the war. According
to them, Roosevelt moved the country toward war while telling a different story to the
American people. They claimed that Roosevelt's frustration over failed attempts to incite
Germany to attack motivated him to provoke Japan in to open a "backdoor" to war with
Germany. Various publications, most notably the Chicago Tribune, Human Events,
Freeman and The National Review, endeavored to publicize and support these views.6
Others, like the American M ercury, which called the attack part o f a plot between the
United States and Russia to carve up the world, stirred the controversy further.7 The
revisionists provided challenges to the accepted view o f American entry into the war.
However, their conclusions concerning Pearl Harbor, that Roosevelt not only provoked
the attack but knew it was coming and intended to keep the information hidden to ensure
that the attack came, were highly controversial.
Two other writers who magnified the dispute by accusing the administration o f having
prior knowledge o f the attack were Admirals Husband E. Kimmel and Robert A.
Theobald. Although they challenged the accepted history of the attack, they differed from
the revisionists by having a far narrower purpose. Instead of attacking the
interventionist policies, they intended to exonerate Kimmel.
Theobald struck first in 1954 with The F inal Secret o f Pearl Harbor: The Washington
Contribution to the Japanese Attack. Theobald had commanded a flotilla o f destroyers in
December, 1941 and was in Hawaii during the attack. He built his case primarily on
circumstantial evidence. Describing one failure after another by the military leaders, he
argued that the only explanation for the withholding of such essential information was that
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Roosevelt had ordered this. He claimed that the President "did not intend that any
American action should cause them (the Japanese) to change their plans at the last
minute."8
Kimmel wrote Admiral Kimmel’s Story in 1955 in defense of his actions and in the
effort to reveal information which had not been made directly available to the public. He
argued that Washington had information prior to December 7 that identified an attack on
Pearl Harbor and blamed Washington for not providing this information to him. Kimmel
asserted that even if the data was provided just two hours before the attack, he could have
at least been able reduce the damage by having all his planes and guns ready to meet the
Japanese planes.9 The failure of the usually competent officers of the War and Navy
Departments to properly command and inform the officers in Hawaii was inexplicable to
Kimmel. He believed that the lack of action on the part of those officers "must have been
in accordance with high political direction."10 Kimmel believed Roosevelt's involvement
was the only explanation for the actions o f Marshall and Stark.

Issues
Having established the motive behind those who challenged the official conclusions
about the attack on Pearl Harbor, it is important to look at the key issues in their challenge
and the official opinions about those issues. As this paper focuses on the Pearl Harbor
incident, the debate over Roosevelt's foreign policy, particularly in relation to
the European countries, will not be covered in detail. This paper examines the matters
which directly pertain to the attack: whether or not Roosevelt wanted war with Japan,
including the "ultimatum"; the information that the American government had prior to the
attack; the war warnings; the actions o f the key people in Washington on the sixth and
seventh o f December; as well as the "Winds Messages."
At the core of the revisionist argument was the information provided by Congress in
the publication o f Pearl Harbor Attack, the multiple volumes of testimony and exhibits put
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together by the Joint Committee. The most important data in this was the collection of
decrypted Japanese messages. The testimonies o f those involved were also scrutinized by
both sides in the debate. Although Roosevelt had died before having a chance to testify,
there were numerous government officials and military officers who did speak to at least
one of the investigations, if not to the Joint Committee itself. Key officials who testified
were General George C. Marshall (Chief of Staff), Admiral Harold Stark (Chief of Naval
Operations), Cordell Hull (Secretary of State) and Henry Stimson (Secretary of War).
Other important testimony was given by War Department officials, Colonel Rufus Bratton
(Chief of Far East Intelligence), Colonel Otis K. Sadtler and Colonel William Friedman, as
well as Naval Department officials, Commander Laurance Safiford (Chief of Security
Intelligence Communications) and Lt. Commander Alwin Kramer (Chief Translator). It
was their statements combined with the Magic reports that fueled the fire o f the debate.
Thus, in addressing each issue the opinions and statements of those involved as well as the
revisionist interpretation will be explained.

Reasons for War
The first issue that must be addressed if one is to believe the accusations against the
President is why he would have desired war with Japan. Had he not, then there would
have been no reason to withhold information and allow the attack to occur. Although
there was strong evidence showing the administration's desire to join in the war against
Germany, there was more debate over whether or not he wanted to enter into war against
Japan. The administration claimed that it had attempted to avoid war with Japan for fear
o f a two front war. Officials declared that the purpose o f the negotiations with Japan had
been to avert war. Their dilemma was that they neither wanted war nor would they
appease Japanese demands and abandon China and possibly European colonies to
Japanese aggression.
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Cordell Hull wrote in his memoirs, published in 1948, that the administration had
worked for peace in the Pacific. He claimed to have felt it "necessary if they were to make
an adequate contribution to the defeat of Hitler...."11 In November of 1941, Roosevelt,
according to Henry Stimson's diary, was trying to stall for an additional six months in
which to build forces to a level which would deter Japanese aggression and guarantee
national security.12 General Marshall testified that the administration had wanted to delay
American involvement until preparations were complete and was hoping to avoid a two
front war.13 At a secret press conference held before the war, Marshall told reporters,
"The last thing the U.S. wants is a war with Japan which would divide our strength."14
Admiral Stark testified that Roosevelt was determined to stop Japanese aggression, that he
even promised privately to resume trade if Japan ceased its aggression.15
Henry Stimson best communicated the administration's dilemma. He noted in his diary
on November 27, 1941 that others were hoping to gain more time for preparation. The
Secretary of War, however, did not want "time at the expense o f humility on the part o f
the United States or o f reopening the thing which would show a U. S. weakness."16 He
claimed that America needed to prevent the Japanese from expanding southward as that
would "encircle U. S. interests in the Philippines and get into vital supplies of rubber in
Malaysia.17
The conspiracists, convinced that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan, refused to accept
these statements. They stressed that Roosevelt, wanting to be in the war and unable to
bait Hitler into attacking, had resorted to war with Japan in order to enter the conflict in
Europe through the "back door." Morgenstern argued that Roosevelt would do anything
to involve the United States in the war due to: the failure o f his domestic policies, his
desire to win a place in world history, his commitment to foreign interests, the need to
tighten his political hold on the country and the pressure asserted by the Army and Navy
leaders who saw the opportunity for increased glory and status.18
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Admiral Theobald also accused Roosevelt o f wanting war with Japan; however, he was
less critical o f the President's motives. Theobald argued that the President, in his role as
the Commander-in-Chief, was looking at the larger picture o f the global war. Roosevelt
had to get America into the war before Hitler's power increased beyond America's ability
to combat it. Theobald believed that Roosevelt was willing to sacrifice the lives of the
men and women at Pearl Harbor as a strategic move. That sacrifice would unite the
nation behind the war effort which would save lives in the long run.19
Admiral Kimmel claimed that Roosevelt had to get America into the war because of
the secret commitments he had made to Great Britain. He argued that the President had
promised Great Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to support the British if Japan
invaded either Siam or the Dutch East Indies or attacked the British. Kimmel cited as
evidence dispatches sent from London that assured British Air Marshall Brook Popham in
Singapore that the U. S. would support Britain in the case o f those actions listed above.20
Kimmel stated that the Japanese, having knowledge of these commitments, concluded that
if they were to attack the British or Dutch colonies, then an attack on U. S. forces was
also necessary.21
Kimmel also directed attention to the comments o f Henry Stimson on the necessity of
having the Japanese fire the first shot. Kimmel took the following two quotes from
Stimson's diary as evidence:
In spite o f the risks involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first
shot, we realized that in order to have the full support o f the American
people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the
ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in any one's mind as to
who were the aggressors.
and
When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was
o f relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way
which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant
feeling in spite of the news of catastropheswhich quickly developed.22

33
Other evidence that the revisionists presented to demonstrate Roosevelt's war aims
were speeches by British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. On November 10, 1941 he
announced that Great Britain would come to the aid o f the United States if it was attacked
by Japan. Theobald reasoned that Churchill would not have made this commitment "with
the tremendous war burdens his country was then supporting, unless he had his quid pro
quo,"23 Kimmel noted that in January of 1942 Churchill told Parliament that he had
received assurances from Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference that the United States
would come into the war in the Far East even if they were not attacked.24 Roosevelt had
promised Churchill to go to war if Britain was attacked, but he had also promised the
American people to stay out of foreign wars. In the case o f Japan only attacking Great
Britain, Roosevelt would have had to break one of these promises. Thus, the revisionists
insisted that Roosevelt needed the Japanese to attack the United States if they attacked
Great Britain.
Morgenstem argued that Roosevelt wanted an attack and accused him o f moving the
Pacific Fleet from its bases in California to Pearl Harbor to invite a Japanese attack.
Roosevelt claimed that he moved the fleet in order to deter Japanese aggression.
However, Admiral J. O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor as Commander of the Pacific
Fleet, was emphatic in his opposition to the President's order. Richardson claimed that the
fleet could not act as a deterrent, arguing that the military government o f Japan would
recognize the weakness of the fleet and its lack of readiness.25 The United States could
not defend the Pacific with the ships that it had nor could it deter Japanese aggression.
However, as Admiral Theobald pointed out, the Pacific Fleet was a target that Japan
wanted eliminated in case of war. He accused Roosevelt of keeping the fleet in Hawaii for
the sole purpose o f provoking Japan into an overt act against the United States 26
The revisionists claimed that American diplomacy also provoked Japan to strike. On
November 25th, 1941 Secretary Hull had proposed offering Japan a "modus vivendi," a
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three month truce during which Japan would stop its aggression and the United States
would open trade and resume oil shipments "in sufficient quantities for the available
population."27 Secretary Stimson did not think that the Japanese would accept such a
drastic proposal, but he did think that the proposal safeguarded American interests by
committing the Japanese to hold off on any aggressive actions. However, Roosevelt and
Hull rejected the "modus vivendi" at the last minute and sent a more rigid proposal.
According to Stimson, the President changed his mind upon hearing of Japanese troop
movements into Indo-China, which Roosevelt saw as "evidence of bad faith on the part o f
the Japanese. "28
Hull explained that the decision to go with this other proposal was influenced by
foreign countries. Churchill opposed the "modus vivendi" on the grounds that it left the
Chinese in a bad position. Hull defended the decision by claiming that the American
people would have opposed supplying Japan with oil, a resource the Asian nation needed
to fulfill its war aims. Hull felt that the Japanese would never accept the new proposal but
claimed he had to "leave no possibility for peace unexplored. "29
The revisionists argued that it was not a peace proposal at all but an ultimatum which
forced Japan to go to war. Morgenstem pointed out that the "ultimatum" called for
complete Japanese withdrawal from China and Indo-China, as well as binding them to
peace in the Pacific and non-intervention in Europe. He charged that these proposals,
rather than striving for compromise, went far beyond any previous offers in their demands
for Japanese capitulation. Morgenstem looked at references to post-war comments by
Shigenori Togo, the Japanese Foreign Minister at the time o f the attack. Togo said, "The
United States had served upon us what we viewed as an ultimatum containing demands far
in excess of the strongest positions theretofore taken."30 Morgenstem believed that
Roosevelt understood how the Japanese would view the proposal but still sent it because
he wanted war.
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Henry Elmer Barnes placed these actions into the argument against interventionism.
He asserted that the United States should have accepted the Japanese terms offered in
November of 1941, because those terms safeguarded America's interests in the Far East.
Barnes argued that the U. S. would have gained more from those terms than they
received through four years of war, without the loss o f lives and huge expenditures.
Barnes portrayed Roosevelt as a war hawk and stated, "By November 25th, the United
States had decided on war with no intention o f reaching a diplomatic settlement. "31

Information
Not only did the revisionists indicate that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan, but they
argued that he knew it was coming. Thus, they continued the wartime debate over how
much information the administration held before the attack and what the information
meant. As explained in the introduction, the United States had intercepted a surfeit of
messages alluding to an attack against it. The nation's civilian and military leaders knew
that the Japanese had secretly set a deadline o f the end o f November for diplomatic
resolution of the situation. The military had intercepted communication between Tokyo
and the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii requesting frequent information about the location
o f Naval ships in Pearl Harbor. The U. S. government had the Japanese reply to the
American ten point proposal, knew that the Japanese were going to break off negotiations
and knew at what time the message was to be delivered.
In addition to this intelligence data, the administration had received warnings o f a
possible attack on Pearl Harbor as early as January, 1941. Admiral Richardson, who was
the fleet commander in Hawaii at the time, sent a message to Admiral Stark, the Chief of
Naval Operations. His message warned that he could not put torpedo nets into the
harbor to protect the ships. Stark, alarmed, wrote back on January 25th that he feared
that Japan might initiate a war with the United States via a surprise attack on the Fleet or
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Base in Pearl Harbor. He also identified the two greatest dangers as being air bombing
and air torpedo attacks.32
A few days later the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo warned an American official that
his intelligence sources had discovered a Japanese war plan which included a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor. American Ambassador, Joseph Grew, sent the warning to
Washington, where it was not taken very seriously.33
In hindsight, the information pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor. The revisionists
argued that government had all this information signifying an attack, so they must have
known about it but kept it secret due to their ulterior motives. Barnes focused particularly
on the fourteen part reply message. He argued that the U. S. had the decoded
message, knew what it meant, knew when it would be delivered, knew o f Japan’s tendency
to initiate wars with a surprise attack and thus must have realized the attack was
coming.34 Morgenstem claimed that the administration knew that the attack would be on
Pearl Harbor. He contended that if Japan was going to make a move, it could not afford
to leave the American fleet untouched at Pearl Harbor. Morgenstem also pointed to the
’’bomb plot messages" as further evidence that the administration knew an attack was
imminent.35
Admiral Kimmel placed the "bomb plot messages" at the center o f his charges against
the administration. He pointed out that Pearl Harbor was the only harbor or base in
American possession which was divided into sub areas: "In no other area was the
Japanese government seeking information into whether two armed vessels were along the
same wharf." Kimmel asserted that had he received this information, he would have taken
different actions.36 Both Theobald and Kimmel argued that these messages gave the
administration definitive proof that the attack would come at Pearl Harbor
and insisted that Kimmel should have been informed o f them.
In contrast to revisionist methods, one needs to keep in mind that the President and his
war council were not reading the past but attempting to predict the future moves o f an
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adversary. In defense of the administration, supporters pointed to the problems of
interpreting mass amounts of information. Much o f the data had to be decoded,
translated, interpreted and disseminated to the proper authorities. There were mistakes
and delays. The various official and private investigations had the advantage of knowing
what they were looking for when conducting their searches. The controversy developed,
because the investigations revealed that the administration did have a lot of information.
However, the officials involved claimed that proper interpretation was not as easy as
hindsight led others to believe.
The administration's principal defense was not that it was completely ignorant o f the
situation but that the information could be interpreted in various ways. In general they
were not sure what to expect, and those who did make a prognosis figured that the war
would start in the Far East. Roosevelt told the cabinet at a meeting on December 7, "We
believed the Japanese would do something."37 A few hours before the attack, Hull told
other officials, "The Japs are planning some devilry." However, Hull, Stimson and Knox
were wondering where the attack would fall.38 Hull claimed that the military should not
have been surprised since he had repeatedly warned of a surprise attack anywhere.39
Marshall and Stark were questioned extensively by the Joint Committee concerning the
information the United States had prior to the attack. Stark clearly stated that he had not
had any direct or advance information that Japan was going to attack the United States.40
He admitted that although a strike on Pearl Harbor was a possibility, he had doubted it
would happen.41 He claimed that Japan had outwitted everyone by moving in more than
one direction, the attention o f the administration being focused on the Japanese
movements into Southeast Asia. Marshall also claimed to have been duped by the
southern advance. He explained the lack o f concern over Pearl Harbor by saying that he
had felt Pearl Harbor was prepared to meet an attack and figured that the Japanese would
never undertake such a risky operation 42
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Neither Stark nor Marshall gave much credit to the "bomb plot messages." The former
testified that he had no recollection of them, but probably would have considered the
messages as basic examples of Japanese attention to detail, keeping track of the American
fleet in case of war.43 Marshall claimed that the messages were not unique to Pearl
Harbor, that the Japanese had made inquiries about Naval vessels all over the Pacific. He
stated that this "dispersed their attention."44 Marshall's claims were supported by the
evidence. The collection of intercepted messages put forth by the Joint Committee
revealed numerous messages asking for information concerning American ships in the
Philippines, Panama, the Far East and in the United States. Although these places had not
been divided into sub areas as Pearl Harbor had been, Tokyo was nevertheless asking for
and receiving information on ships, planes and defenses outside of Hawaii.45 Looking at
the number o f documents, one can imagine how the American officials may have
misinterpreted the information.
Another important officer who had access to the information and defended the
administration was William Friedman. The man who broke the Purple code, in a pamphlet
that was not declassified until 1981, explained why the administration failed to predict the
attack despite the information they had. He said that the problem was that no one person
"studied the whole story Magic was telling." No one was responsible for putting all the
clues together to study the long range view of the situation.46 He discussed the problems
inherent in processing the information. Most importantly, he argued that there was
nothing in Magic that explicitly pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor could
there have been. He pointed out that Magic was the information gained from decoding
the diplomatic code, and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo who sent the diplomatic
messages testified that he had not known about the plan to attack Hawaii. If Togo told
the truth, than Magic did not reveal where Japan planned to strike.47
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War Messages
Even if the administration did not know positively where the attack would occur,
certainly the President had enough intelligence data to realize that relations were quickly
deteriorating to a state o f war, but did he conspire to withhold this information? Prior to
the attack on Pearl Harbor, senior members o f the United States Government knew
that the secret Japanese deadline for completion of negotiations had passed. They knew
that the Japanese had instructed their embassies to destroy code machines as well as secret
files and warned that "things would automatically begin to happen." Tension between the
two countries increased as did Japan's interest in specific data on the ships and defenses in
Pearl Harbor. Washington had all this information, but the commanders in Oahu did not.
The questions over whether or not the commanders had sufficient information and why
they had not been provided all o f the information inspired much debate.
Stark and Stimson, who both sent warning messages to Hawaii in late November,
claimed that the commanders were informed on what was happening and therefore should
have been prepared for anything. Stark's message to Kimmel actually began with the
words, "This message is to be considered a war warning." Stark claimed it was an
unequivocal war warning. Although it directed attention to a possible attack on the
Philippines and other locations in the Far East, Stark noted that it did not exclude Hawaii
and actually notified Kimmel to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment."48 Stark
argued that Kimmel should have been prepared, because Kimmel himself had written to
Stark earlier in 1941 about the possibility of surprise attack on Hawaii by Japan. In
addition, Stark noted that he sent Kimmel a message on December 3 which informed him
that the Japanese were ordering their embassies and consulates to destroy their codes and
secret documents. Stark emphasized that Washington had received the diplomatic
information, evaluated it and sent the conclusions and recommendations to Hawaii. He
asserted that Kimmel had received enough information from Washington.49
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While Stark was informing Kimmel, Stimson sent a message to General Walter Short,
the Commanding General in Hawaii and the man responsible for the defense of the Fleet
when it was in harbor. Stimson had sent the message, because Marshall was out of
Washington to observe manuevers. Although the message did not precisely warn of an air
attack on Pearl Harbor, Stimson thought the warning was sufficient. He testified that
Short, having been warned, should have remained on alert "like a sentinel on duty."50 The
majority of the Joint Committee agreed with Stark and Stimson, blaming the Pearl Harbor
commanders for failing to take the necessary steps to protect the fleet.51
The conspiracists disagreed with this assessment. They argued that the message was
unclear and failed to convey the severity of the situation. Admiral Kimmel defended his
own actions in response to this so called "war warning" by claiming that it was ambiguous.
He argued that it warned o f war in the Far East.52 He also noted that on the day he
received the warning, he was directed to send fifty percent o f his planes as well as his
carriers on a mission away from the base. From these orders, Kimmel understood that
Washington did not expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.53 Senators Ferguson and Brewster
agreed with Kimmel. They wrote in the M inority Report, "The War Department and the
Navy Department did not instruct Short and Kimmel to put into effect an all-out war
alert."54
Admiral Theobald saw the message as clear evidence that information was being
purposely withheld. He pointed out that the authorities in Washington knew that in the
days preceding the attack the Hawaiian commanders were not taking actions
commensurate with the situation; they were preparing for sabotage. Washington should
have given further orders to the base commanders, but it did not. Theobald emphasized
that the military leaders would not have made such a mistake. They would have sent a
clear warning or taken steps to ensure the safety of Pearl Harbor, particularly officers as
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competent as Harold Stark and George Marshall. He concluded that the only explanation
for the negligent actions o f the Chief o f Staff and the Chief o f Naval Operations was that
they were acting under orders from President Roosevelt.55
As further evidence o f Roosevelt's complicity, Theobald referred to a statement by
Admiral Stark. The Chief of Naval Operations stated that his conscience was clear,
"because all his official reactions in the days before Pearl Harbor had been governed by
orders from higher authority." Theobald reminded the reader that the only higher authority
was the President.56

Events of December 6 and 7
Stark's preceding statement was only one of many controversial statements by both him
and General Marshall. Their testimonies of what they were doing on the sixth and seventh
of December precipitated more debate. The argument over the war messages was based
on the interpretation of those messages and thus the administration was able to defend
itself to some degree. However, the actions of key officials in Washington just prior to the
attack were far more difficult to justify and provided further impetus to the revisionist
attack. As previously mentioned, the government had translated the first thirteen parts of
the Japanese reply on December 6. Although it was not a declaration o f war, the
language o f the dispatch provided evidence that negotiations were finished. Roosevelt had
declared, "This means war." On the morning of the seventh, while Hull waited for the
Japanese to commit some "devilry," additional dispatches hinted that war would begin at
one o'clock Washington time, early morning in Hawaii, which was supposed to be an ideal
time for an air attack. Admiral Stark received the dispatches on December 7 at nine in the
morning, which was 3:30 A.M. Hawaii time. He said, "My God! This means war. I must
get word to Kimmel at once."57 However, he did not act on these words. No message
was sent in time to alert the commanders in Pearl Harbor.

42
The official explanation of what transpired did little to alleviate doubts. The
revisionists attacked the actions o f the civilian and military leaders, claiming they were
either guilty o f incompetence or of conspiring to allow the attack to occur. In support of
these claims they addressed the following items which did not make sense:
1. Roosevelt, after declaring "This means war," did not meet with the
leaders of the military nor even speak with Marshall until after the attack.
2. Neither Marshall nor Stark could remember what they were doing on
the eve o f the attack.
3. Captain Harold D. Krick, Stark's friend, told Congress he had been
with Stark on the night of the sixth. He revealed that Stark had spoken to
Roosevelt on the phone that night and then had told Krick that
"conditions in the Pacific were serious and relations with Japan were in a
critical state."58 Still, Stark could not recall the subject of his conversation
with Roosevelt.59
4. Both Marshall and Stark claimed that they had not received the first 13
parts o f the Japanese reply until the morning o f the seventh, although it had
come in on the afternoon of the sixth.
5. Marshall did not arrive at his office until almost 11:00 A.M., because he
had been riding his horse that morning.
6. Stark decided to do nothing until Marshall arrived.
7. Neither Stark nor Marshall sent any warning to Oahu until almost noon.
Marshall decided to send the message. Marshall could have used his
scrambler phone to call directly. He could have used the naval
communications system. Instead he sent the warning via Western Union
and RCA radio, because heavy static had blacked out the army's radio
circuits. The message did not get to General Short until more than seven
hours after the attack began.60
8. Colonel Rufus Bratton told the Army Pearl Harbor Board that he had
given the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to Marshall's secretary on
the sixth. However, he then told Congress that he must have been
mistaken, because "honorable men" such as Marshall and others said they
had not received them.61
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During the various investigations, Stark and Marshall were repeatedly questioned
about what had happened. Both defended themselves and provided a number o f plausible
explanations which the conspiracists omitted or belittle in their writings. Both officers
created speculation by their memory lapses; however, Marshall reminded the Joint
Committee that it had been four years from Pearl Harbor to his testimony and that he had
spent those four years occupied with the war effort. Marshall also explained that his
horseback ride was not a bizarre occurrence but part of his normal Sunday morning
routine.62 Against charges that he had been in the office, not riding a horse, Marshall
provided proof in the form o f a memo from the secretary to the General Staff that he
arrived around 11:00 A M .63
Both officers defended their actions regarding the transmission o f warnings on the
morning of the seventh. Stark stated that he hesitated to send an additional warning to
Kimmel, because he was afraid that sending too many warnings would cause confusion.64
He did not explain how this would have caused confusion. Marshall explained that he
had chosen not to use the scrambler phone on his desk, because he had needed to alert all
theatres. He claimed he had thought that the attack was more likely to come at the
Philippines or the Panama Canal, and thus most likely would have called those places
before Oahu. He asserted that he was trying to get information to divers places
simultaneously and felt that phoning each command individually would take too much
time, particularly due to the odd hour o f the day in some o f the places.65
Colonel Edward F. French of the Army Signal Corps defended the use of Western
Union and RCA. He noted that the army had used that route before and had found it both
accurate as well as quick. He pointed out that the RCA transmitter was four times as
powerful as the Army's. French also admitted that he never told Marshall what route the
message would take.66 According to these statements, Marshall had not purposely sent
the message to Pearl Harbor by the most roundabout route but had tried to dispatch the
message to a number o f places as quickly as possible. Marshall told the Roberts'
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Commission that army officials assured him that the message would arrive in Hawaii
around 7:00 A.M. and thus expected the message to arrive on time.67
This testimony did not convince the conspiracists. Examining all the evidence, they
maintained their opinion that these strange actions pointed to a cover up. George
Morgenstem summed up his suspicions regarding what happened in Washington prior to
the attack:
What went on at the White House and among the officials o f the
government and of the Army and Navy high command that night is a
mystery which still awaits solution ... It is about inconceivable that the
witnesses still alive can have forgotten what happened, but General
Marshall and Admiral Stark repeatedly testified under oath that they cannot
remember."68
Men who acted decisively at many times in their careers both before and after Pearl
Harbor did not act decisively at such a crucial time and could not remember what they had
been doing. The lack o f a satisfactory explanation for these activities combined with the
charges by the revisionists made this issue one of the strongest o f the controversy and one
that continued to cause dispute. Even when the Marshall Foundation released the
Marshall papers in 1963, the New York Times questioned why Marshall could not
remember what he was doing on the sixth, why he was so late getting to his office, and
why he did not use the scrambler phone.69

The Winds Messages
Another item which developed out of contradicting testimonies to become a focal point
of the revisionist attack and remain at the center of the controversy for decades was the
"Winds Message." This controversy began with Japanese fears o f losing communication
with their embassies and consulates as the situation deteriorated. On November 19,
Tokyo instructed its embassy in Washington that if an emergency situation developed and
international communications were cut, it would deliver a secret message in its daily short
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wave newscast. The message would be hidden in the weather report. Separate codes
were established for problems with America, Britain and Russia. Higashi No Kazeame
meaning "East Wind Rain" was to signal that relations between Japan and the United
States were in danger. If the message was heard, the embassy was to destroy all its codes
and secret papers.70
After this message, the United States was vigilant in listening for a "Winds Execute
Message," the actual broadcast of the signal. However, after the war, military officers
disagreed over whether or not the United States had ever received a "Winds Execute
Message." Commander Laurance Safford, U.S.N., the Chief of Security Intelligence
Communications, initiated the dispute. He testified that at 8:30 AM on December 4th, the
radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland received a "Winds Execute Message."
According to Safford, Captain Alwin Kramer brought the message to him and had written
the translation on it, "War with England, War with the United States, Peace with Russia."
Safford assured the Joint Committee that he sent one copy to his superior, Rear Admiral
Noyes, six or seven copies to the army and additional copies to other people on the Magic
distribution list. He boldly stated, "It was a Winds Message. It meant war and we knew it
meant war."71 Safford could not produce a copy of the message but claimed that there
was a blank file in the office safe which he insisted represented the missing message.72
Safford's testimony was controversial, because none of the people to whom he
allegedly distributed the message corroborated his testimony. Captain Kramer was in
charge of the OP-20-G subsection responsible for translating decrypted ciphers and
recovery o f Japanese codes and the man who Safford claimed gave him the message.
Kramer denied that he had received a Winds Message pertaining to the United States
before December but did testify to seeing a Winds Message that signified a break in
diplomatic relations with Great Britain. He also discussed the missing or cancelled
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message in the files o f the messages. He reported that it was not unusual for there to be
blanks in the files for various reasons and noted that there were similar cancelled numbers
in the files for 1940.73
In spite o f Safford's statement that he had sent copies o f the message to the Army,
three army intelligence officers denied ever seeing it. Both Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, the
Chief o f Far East Intelligence, and Otis K. Sadtler, the Chief o f Signals Intelligence,
professed to seeing a message that meant a break between Japan and Great Britain, not the
United States.74 Bratton also declared that had the U. S. received a Winds Execute
Message, it would not have been important, because it did not give any new information.
They already knew that Japan was preparing for war; the Winds Message would not have
specified the plan o f attack.75
William Friedman, who claimed to have been in the best position of anyone in
Washington to see a Winds Execute Message, agreed with Bratton's analysis of its
importance and argued against its existence.76 At the Hewitt Inquiry, Friedman affirmed
that the U. S. did not intercept such a message until late at night on the seventh, after the
attack. This conformed with the stated Japanese purpose to use the code if their
communications were disrupted.77 In private notes written shortly after the Congressional
hearings, Friedman admitted that Safford clearly thought that he had seen a Winds
Execute, but Friedman postulated that Safford had seen a false message.78
Despite the lack o f proof and the numerous statements to the contrary, the revisionists
insisted that Safford had told the truth. Percy Greaves charged the administration with
attempting to conceal the affair, pointing out that certain individuals changed their
statements. He criticized the Hewitt Inquiry for only calling witnesses who had previously
testified to seeing the message and getting them to change their story under further
questioning.79 George Morgenstem charged the administration with denying the
existence o f the message, stealing the copies o f it, and forcing or bribing those who had
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seen it to remain silent or change their testimony. He labeled these actions among "the
great scandals o f Pearl Harbor."80
The M ajority Report o f the Joint Committee ruled that there was too much evidence
against such a message having been received.81 However, the revisionist attacks kept the
issue alive in the minds o f the public and caused them to doubt the official statements.
The issue would remain and after three decades rise again with the revelation of further
evidence. (See Chapter Four.)

Conclusion
In the decade following the Second World War, two groups challenged the official
findings on the Pearl Harbor attack. Examining the information made available by the
government, both the defenders o f Admiral Husband Kimmel and the revisionists found
support for their causes. Although they could not produce any direct proof that Roosevelt
and his advisors had known that the Japanese would strike Pearl Harbor on the morning of
December seventh, they did bring forth sufficient information to raise doubt about the
claims o f the administration. These writers argued that diplomatic and military actions
hinted that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan. They displayed information that when
pieced together properly suggested that the administration should have known the
Japanese plans. They criticized the vague warnings to the commanders in Oahu. They
also pointed out how the discrepancies and omissions in the testimonies o f key
officials alluded to the withholding o f information and a coverup of misdeeds.
In order to prove their argument, Kimmel, Theobald and the revisionists relied on a
conspiracy theory. Only a conspiracy by top officials could have succeeded in withholding
the information, concealing the facts, and silencing those who knew the truth. By forging
this thesis and demonstrating how the evidence supported it, the conspiracists created a
stir and escalated the controversy.
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Theobald and Kimmel hoped only to prove that the latter had been used as a
scapegoat; the revisionists pursued a much larger agenda and ultimately failed. Although
they challenged the actions o f the Roosevelt administration, the revisionists did not reverse
the course of American foreign policy nor alter American opinion about the war. More
than three decades have passed since Barnes' Perpetual Warfo r Perpetual Peace and in
that time, America has consistently maintained a global approach to foreign affairs.
Recent actions in Somalia, Iraq and Haiti have only emphasized this. Textbooks focus on
the glory and importance o f America's participation in World War Two. The hopes o f the
Pearl Harbor revisionists failed to materialize; yet, those writers did create doubts over
Pearl Harbor. Even with the decline of the revisionist cause, the controversy continued.

CHAPTER m
REVISIONISM CHALLENGED, HINDERED AND REVISED

The revisionist view of Pearl Harbor peaked in the decade after the war. The
revisionists based their arguments on the belief that Roosevelt had known of the attack
and wanted it to happen. Examining the information collected by Congress, these writers
capitalized on the exposure o f secret information, various comments by officials, claims by
the base commanders, hints o f additional, unrevealed secrets and the memory lapses as
well as the mistakes of key officials. They used this information and filled the void
between it and their theories to construct arguments which, although based on
circumstantial evidence, were outwardly convincing. These interpretations sustained the
doubts which had developed amidst the unanswered charges and secrecy of the war years.
However, the revisionists did not provide the only conclusions concerning the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Other writers disputed the revisionist attacks and aimed to defend
the administration by offering alternative interpretations that were not based on missing
evidence and conspiracies. At the same time, the revisionists encountered opposition in
the media and difficulties in publishing their views. Realist and New Left historians fit
Pearl Harbor into their own ideas. Even Henry Elmer Barnes revised his account by
narrowing the scope o f the original conspiracy theory. By the end of the sixties, the
Revisionist Theory o f Pearl Harbor had lost some of its greatest proponents, and the
controversy over the attack continued to fade throughout the seventies.
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Attacking the Revisionists
Many writers defended the administration, attempting to show that the government had
done everything to keep peace while preparing for war and avoiding a policy of
appeasement. They admitted that mistakes were made, but insisted that these were honest
mistakes justified by the situation and the structural and personal limitations involved.
They explicitly disputed the charges of conspiracy and challenged both the logic and the
evidence behind those charges.
In 1948 Samuel Eliot Morison published one of the first defenses of the administration
in the third volume of his History o f the United States Naval Operations in World War
II. Morison articulated one o f the central ideas in the challenge to revisionism: that the
administration had been vigilant and attentive to the information but had focused on
the wrong place. He argued that the administration had discovered that the Japanese were
preparing for war and did not attempt to conceal that information from the commanders
in Oahu. To support this, he pointed out that the military leaders gave warnings to those
commanders and claimed the warnings were clear. Morison argued that one fault of the
American leaders was their belief that the attack would occur in the Far East, which
resulted in them ignoring the warning signs related to Pearl Harbor.1 Seth Richardson, the
General Consul to the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, concurred with this
assessment. In an article in The Saturday Evening Post, he said that the reoccupation
with Southeast Asia and a belief in Hawaii’s invulnerability allowed the military to miss
important signals.2
Some writers went beyond just defending the administration and attacked the
revisionists directly. Morison criticized Charles Beard for being a relativist and
for selecting only facts which fit into his frame o f reference.3 Robert Ferrell called the
revisionists "violent and angry men" and criticized Perpetual Warfo r Perpetual Peace for
lacking objectivity. Ferrell argued that the disaster was caused by military errors and was
not a matter o f "diplomatic planning."4 Hans Louis Trefouse blamed the Japanese for
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choosing to go to war and edited a book containing the important documents pertaining to
the controversy. He insisted that these documents did not divulge where the Japanese
were planning to strike. Claiming that the fault lay in mistakes, oversights and lack of
intelligence information, he accused the conspiracists o f being "willing to believe the worst
of men they had come to hate. "5
Basil Rauch’s Roosevelt, From M unich to Pearl Harbor, published in 1950, also
attacked the revisionists and their arguments. In the beginning o f the book he asserted
that it was not difficult to find proof that refuted the "isolationist thesis."6 He also
accused Charles Beard of attempting to destroy "the faith o f America in the honesty of
President Roosevelt."7 Claiming that Hull and Roosevelt negotiated in good faith, Rauch
contested the revisionists by placing the blame on the Japanese. He argued that the
Japanese were not only unwilling to compromise but were guilty o f delivering an
ultimatum. To Rauch, the secret deadline messages did more than reveal Japanese war
intentions; they presented an ultimatum complete with demands, a specific deadline and
the threat o f repercussions if the demands were not met.8 He argued that the winds
messages were unimportant and that the only bomb plot messages that discussed an aerial
attack were not decoded until after the attack.9
Herbert Feis, in an article for the Yale Review in 1956, challenged the revisionist
evaluation o f pre-war American foreign policy. Rejecting the notion that the U.S. wanted
war with Japan, he argued that Roosevelt had not made promises to the British and Dutch
to enter the war and that American leaders sought to avoid dividing American forces.
Feis also discussed a few ideas that the revisionists had not considered. He supported the
embargo on Japan on the grounds that America could not trade war goods to the Japanese
due to the latter's alliance with Germany, a potential American enemy.10 Feis countered
the belief that Hull's ten point proposal was an ultimatum by pointing out that the Japanese
reply never accused America of giving an ultimatum but o f impeding Japanese goals.11
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Japanese Views
The anti-revisionist views involved opposing interpretations o f the evidence, but
information from Japan was more damaging to some of the revisionist claims. In
testimony at the Tokyo Trials, in recovered documents, in interviews with historians or in
their own works, former Japanese officials provided additional insight into what had
happened. In 1946, the Japanese Navy released data on the planning and operation of the
attack. It contradicted the idea that Roosevelt had long known when the attack would
occur. According to the report, the Japanese cabinet did not decide on the date until the
second of December, 1941.12
In 1951, Robert Ward provided Japanese evidence contrasting the charge that
Roosevelt had lured the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. Ward insisted that the Japanese
had been planning to attack Pearl Harbor from as early as January o f 1941, months before
any ’’ultimatum1' that may have provoked Japan. He asserted that it was the Japanese
admiral, Isoroku Yamamoto, who had developed the plan over the course o f the year and
insisted that it be implemented.13 Ward explained how Japanese efforts to maintain
secrecy was the major reason that America was surprised by the attack. These efforts
included the Navy keeping the plans secret from the rest o f the government, maintenance
o f strict radio silence by the attacking fleet and the transfer o f the regular radio officers
from this fleet to other ships in Japanese waters to further impede efforts to find the
carriers.14 Thus, Ward's paper highlighted the successes of an intelligent, perfectlyexecuted Japanese plan as opposed to American failure or duplicity.
In 1956, Shigemori Togo, who had been the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1941, wrote
an article for U.S. News and World Report. He blamed the Roosevelt administration for
not trusting Japan, negotiating half-heartedly and pushing Japan into the war.15 However,
he also confirmed the stealth involved in the planning, admitting that he had no prior
knowledge of the plans to strike Hawaii. He claimed that the Japanese Navy kept the
plans secret and only asked that negotiations be continued until the attack.16 These
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statements put into doubt the charge that Togo's diplomatic communication, intercepted
and decoded by the United States, revealed the plan to attack Hawaii.

The Media
Another element which thwarted revisionist efforts was the bias o f the media and
publication industry. Both gave more support to pro-Roosevelt books and articles than to
those o f the revisionists. As early as 1953, Barnes complained that the revisionist writers
were the victims of a smear campaign and attempts to prevent them from publishing.
Barnes stated that only a few small publishing companies would print the revisionist
works. He insisted that important periodicals such as Time, Newsweek, The New Yorker,
The Nation and The National Review ignored the revisionist theories or attacked them
with "great ferocity and unfairness."17 Detailing the attacks against the revisionists,
Barnes argued vehemently against many o f the allegations.
Barnes was not being paranoid. The mainstream media did argue against the
revisionists. The New York Times and The New York H erald Tribune employed prominent
anti-revisionist writers such as Rauch, Samuel Flagg Bemis and Arthur Schlesinger to
review revisionist works.18 The Times agreed with Morison's opinion that the
administration did not know what the Japanese were planning and that the administration
was focused on events in Indo-China.19
After the publication of Theobald's book, the Times questioned Marshall and Stark.
The New York paper solicited responses to Theobald's charges that the Pacific Fleet was
used as a decoy to make the Japanese attack and that the two military men had received
orders to withhold information from Short and Kimmel. On April 18th, 1954 the Times
reported that both had emphatically answered "no" to the queries.20
Barnes recognized the declining influence o f the revisionist version o f Pearl Harbor and
blamed it on the collaboration between the government and the historical profession. He
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compared this to the control over society in George Orwell's 1984, claiming that
"historical writing and interpretation are being brought into line with the needs and
attitudes of a sick political regime."21 As evidence, he cited the vast number of historians
who had entered into war propaganda work, Truman's move to establish a group o f
official historians and the growing number o f historians openly supporting the cold war.22
He charged the government with attempts at thought control in relation to the Pearl
Harbor dispute through their use o f official historians, removal and destruction of
documents, classification o f information as top secret and forcing officials to alter
their testimonies.23 Barnes feared that the anti- revisionists would succeed in blacking out
the revisionist arguments.

New Ideas
The sixties brought new ideas and new challenges to revisionism. In 1962, Roberta
Wohlstetter published what The New York Times labeled the "distinct book" on Pearl
Harbor.24 Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision altered the debate and helped to quell
the controversy, because it moved the focus away from whom to blame and disregarded
the arguments over the direction of America's foreign policy. Using her background as an
intelligence expert and concentrating on the lessons that could be learned from the failures,
Wohlstetter argued that the disaster was caused by a series of mistakes and explained how
these could affect America's future. According to her, the main reasons for these blunders
were: the surfeit of irrelevant intelligence; the bias in Washington for information on the
European Theater o f Operations; the failure to act on certain warnings in many branches
o f the military including the intelligence division and the Hawaiian commands; the
evidence available to support the wrong interpretations; the efforts of the Japanese to hide
the relevant signals; the desire o f the United States to keep secret what it knew and normal
bureaucratic problems.
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Many o f Wohlstetter's conclusions contradicted those o f the revisionists, particularly
her assessment o f the information available to the government prior to the war. She
contested the belief that the "bomb plot messages" provided clear proof that Pearl Harbor
was the designated target, claiming that the Army and Navy intelligence units
misinterpreted the information. In support o f this, she noted the testimony of several
naval officers who stated at the Congressional Hearings that they had not determined
absolutely why the information was being requested. One officer noted that Tokyo could
have wanted to determine the speed at which the fleet could set to sea in case of actions
elsewhere.25 Wohlstetter said that there were similar requests relating to other ports in
the United States and its territories. She conceded that the government could have
noticed the increasing Japanese demands for information on Pearl Harbor and the
Philippines, but insisted that nobody had separated the useful information from the
useless.26
She explained the lack o f attention to dispatches such as the "bomb plot messages by:
the very human tendency to pay attention to the signals that support
current expectations about enemy behavior. If one is listening to the
signals of an attack against a highly improbable target, then it is very
difficult for the signals to be heard.27
Wohlstetter argued that the ambiguous war warnings were not evidence o f a sinister
plot. Her interpretation was that the ambiguity was typical. It reflected the hesitancy of
intelligence officers to make definite predictions about events which could be reversed at
the last minute. She added that a full alert was dangerous in that it could have led to a
situation where the U.S. had to make an overt act against Japan.28
Wohlstetter dulled the controversy by taking the matter away from the key
administration officials and explaining it in terms o f the limitations inherent in intelligence
work. Two decades after Pearl Harbor, she stressed that it was not the result o f a
conspiracy but o f the type of failures that could happen again. She said:
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If the study o f Pearl Harbor has anything to offer for the future, it is this:
We have to accept the fact o f uncertainty and learn to live with it. No
magic, in code or otherwise, will provide certainty. Our plans must work
without it.29
Other neutral opinions appeared in the fifties and sixties. George Kennan took a realist
approach to the situation. Denying the existence of a conspiracy, he stressed that
America's failure was in neglecting to pursue all possibilities.30 The New Left Historians
Walter Lefeber and William Appleman Williams criticized Roosevelt for pursuing the
policy of the open door and international trade to solve domestic economic troubles.
Although they remained neutral on the Pearl Harbor issue, they emphasized that
America's insistence on the open door led to economic interventionism, which in term led
to conflicts with Japan over resources in the Far East.31

A New Revisionist Theory
Regardless of the new theories and the difficulties that revisionism faced, Barnes did
not accept defeat in the sixties. In the light of new evidence, he revised the conspiracy
theory, limiting the blame to Marshall and Roosevelt. In an article for The National
Review in 1966, Barnes exonerated Frank Knox, the former Secretary o f the Navy. He
credited Knox with trying to send a warning message to Pearl Harbor on the sixth and
blamed Marshall and Roosevelt for the message not getting to Hawaii.32
Two years later, he wrote ''Pearl Harbor after a Quarter of a Century" for the journal
L eft and R ight in which he expanded on his idea of a limited conspiracy involving less
people and beginning much later. He argued that Roosevelt did not learn o f the Japanese
intentions until December 4th, and worked with Marshall over the following three days to
prevent word leaking to Kimmel and Short. He admitted that the failure o f the October
bomb plot messages to reach Admiral Kimmel was not Roosevelt's fault but that of
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, the head o f Naval War plans. Barnes excused Turner,
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claiming that he was not guilty o f conspiracy but of preoccupation with events in the
Atlantic.33 He also saw Admiral Stark as a minor member o f the conspiracy who had
been prevented against his will from informing Kimmel.34
According to Barnes, Roosevelt was determined to get the United States into the war
but needed a Japanese attack to assure public support for the war effort. On December 4,
Roosevelt learned that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor but feared that if
the Hawaiian commanders were warned, their actions might prevent the attack from
occurring.35 Barnes argued that Marshall was indebted to the President and thus followed
Roosevelt's orders to keep the Pearl Harbor commanders uninformed. Marshall then
informed Stark to do the same. This theory explained why Stark called Roosevelt on the
morning o f the seventh and then did not call Kimmel. It explained why Marshall
disappeared for the afternoon of the sixth and morning o f the seventh and did not arrive in
time to send a warning that would arrive before the air strike.36 Barnes claimed that
Marshall had told Senator Barkley at the Congressional hearings that he could not reveal
where he had been the night o f December 6th, as it would have "got the Chief (Roosevelt)
in trouble. "37
Barnes attested that there were new pieces of information which proved that by
December 4th, Roosevelt knew about Japanese intentions to attack the United States. He
claimed that British intelligence in the Far East had informed London that the Japanese
were going to attack the United States; a Russian spy, Richard Sorge, had informed
Stalin that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor; and an anonymous American Army
Intelligence officer had gained knowledge of the Japanese plan and notified Washington.38
Barnes also drew conclusions from General Henry H. Arnold's trip to the west coast in
the days preceding Pearl Harbor. He argued that Arnold, the Chief of the Army Air
Corps, would not have been allowed out o f Washington for the official purpose of
expediting a flight of bombers to the Philippines. Barnes claimed that Arnold, knowing
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the attack was coming and worrying about his planes, flew to the West Coast to disperse
planes concentrated in one spot to prevent sabotage.39
Two decades after the first revisionist books on the war, Barnes' article demonstrated
that the revisionists had not given up on their accusations against Roosevelt. He made a
convincing argument that explained many of the questionable actions o f the military
leaders and claimed that Roosevelt had received evidence about the attack on Pearl
Harbor. However, he still lacked direct proof to support his argument.

Into the Seventies
Barnes died in 1968, shortly after finishing his article for Left and Right and with his
passing, the controversy over Pearl Harbor began to decline. The revisionist goals had
failed. Rather than returning to a policy of isolationism, America was involved in another
war in Asia. During the 1970's the media paid little attention to the dispute and rarely
mentioned Pearl Harbor outside of anniversary pieces. Without further proof, the
revisionists could not convince people that their interpretations were correct. Their
allegations that had fueled the controversy during and immediately after the war were less
convincing under closer review of the information. Opposing interpretations were also
convincing and depended less on alleged information.
In the seventies historians had a new war and new controversies to study. The few
books on the subject that were published treated the revisionist accusations as
history. A 1973 book, Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese- American Relations, 19311941, barely covered the controversy. It focused on analyzing the foreign policies of both
countries rather than determining whether or not there was a conspiracy. George Waller's
Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt and the Coming o f the War, published in 1976 was a collection
o f official documents and articles which included the works of revisionists, administration
officials, Roberta Wohlstetter and more recent scholars like Akira Iriye and George
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MacGregor Bums. It was written not to advocate one side or the other, but to provide
examples of the varying viewpoints pertaining to the attack on Pearl Harbor and
American foreign policy in the years prior to it. By the seventies, the information
uncovered by the official investigations had been interpreted and reinterpreted in a
plethora of books, articles and pamphlets. However, without new information, without
proof for the accusations, the controversy appeared to be fading into the past.

CHAPTER IV
NEW INFORMATION, SAME DISPUTE

Henry Elmer Barnes predicted in 1953 that it would take a political or economic
disaster to force the public to change its views and accept revisionism.1 Revisionist
arguments and the entire Pearl Harbor controversy lost importance in the 1970's, but
Watergate and the Vietnam War eroded public confidence in America's governing officials
and in the policy o f internationalism. The combination o f America's attitude toward its
government and the revelation o f new information pertaining to the attack revived the
controversy. The most important ingredient for this revival was the renewal o f the belief
that the government was concealing facts.
Information released under the Freedom of Information Act, new allegations from
those involved, and alternative interpretations ignited the dispute. One interesting
characteristic o f the new debate was that it contained many o f the same ingredients as the
old. John Toland, James Rusbridger and Eric Nave presented new evidence supporting
the existence o f a conspiracy, although the latter two were suggesting new conspirators.
Gordon Prange, Alvin Coox, Stanley Weintraub and others disputed the conspiracists with
still more evidence. Katherine Dillon and Donald Goldstein provided additional
information from Japanese sources. Admiral Edwin Layton and Captain Edward Beach
continued the defense o f Admiral Kimmel. Donald Clausen blamed Kimmel and defended
Marshall. Others argued that attitudes not individuals were culpable. Thus, after laying
dormant in the seventies, the Pearl Harbor Controversy charged back in the eighties and
nineties. Accusations were made and challenged, multiple "Final Books" on Pearl Harbor
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were written, but throughout the time nobody was able to produce the all convincing
conclusion to the controversy.

New Accusations
John Toland's Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, published in 1982, was the
book that ignited anew the flames o f controversy. Toland wrote the book to address
questions he felt had never been answered. Using data released under the Freedom of
Information Act and interviews with people who had been involved, he presented new
evidence supporting the charge that Roosevelt had prior knowledge o f the attack.2
Specifically, he revived arguments over both the Winds Message and Marshall's actions in
the last hours before the war. He also charged that the U.S. government had tracked the
Japanese Fleet, the Kido Butai in its voyage across the Pacific. Some people accepted
Toland's claims, but others challenged them, leading to further books and articles on the
subject.
Toland reasoned that the official statements o f the events in Washington on the sixth
and seventh o f December, 1941 were false. He reasoned that the President would have
summoned his Army and Navy commanders to the White House after receiving the first
thirteen parts of the reply. The official statements showed that Roosevelt did not do this,
but Toland discovered a letter written by a close friend of Henry Knox. In this
correspondence, Knox told the friend that "he, Stimson, Marshall, Stark and Harry
Hopkins had spent most o f the night o f December 6th at the White House with the
President." Toland revealed that Stimson's military aide, Major Harrison, claimed that he
saw Marshall at Stimson's office at ten o'clock on the morning o f the seventh, not on
horseback.3 Toland also questioned Marshall's decision not to use the scrambler phone.
Stanley Weintraub disagreed with Toland. His 1991 work, Long Day's Journey Into
War, was an hour by hour account of what was happening all over the world on December
7th, 1941. In it, Weintraub described Marshall's horseback ride on the morning o f the
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seventh and defended Marshall for getting to the office as quickly as possible once he was
contacted.4 He also added support for Marshall's conviction that the scrambler phone was
considered unsafe by recounting the comments o f Rear Admiral Claude Block, the
Commandant of the Hawaiian Naval District. Block spoke with Admiral Stark over the
scrambler phone after the attack, but when Stark asked for damage estimates, Block was
afraid the line was unsafe.5
Toland also revived the controversy over the Winds Message. Believing that the
witnesses who changed their testimonies were part o f a cover-up and recognizing
Laurance Safford's conviction that the United States did intercept a Winds Execute
Message, Toland felt the subject warranted further investigation. He found support for
Safford in an interview with Chief Warrant Officer Ralph T. Briggs. In this interview,
conducted in 1977, Briggs claimed that he was the person on duty when the winds
message was received and that he was forbidden to testify in support o f Captain
Safford.6
The 1977 interview o f Briggs by a naval historian supported Toland's claim. Briggs
had been a naval intercept operator assigned to the Naval Communications Station in
Cheltenham, Maryland. Briggs declared that on December 4th, 1941 he intercepted a
message which said, "Higashi No Kazeame." This translated to East Winds Rain, the
code words for a break in relations with the United States. After receiving the message he
sent the original and the copies to OP-20-G in Washington where it was disseminated.7
Briggs claimed that a number o f officers were informed o f he message including Captain
Kramer, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, Admiral Stark, Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Bratton
and General Miles.8 All of these men testified to Congress that they had not seen a Winds
Message.
Briggs himself was never called before Congress. He said that he met with Safford and
agreed to testify at the Congressional hearings. However, his commander, Captain John

63
Harper, ordered him to neither testify nor contact Safford without his approval. Harper
told Briggs that "too much has been revealed already" and that he could not explain the
orders at that point in time.9 Briggs believed that someone with authority over Captain
Harper applied pressure to prevent his testimony.10 Thus, thirty-six years after Safford's
claims before Congress, another witness finally supported his testimony.
As with Safford, not everyone believed Briggs and Toland. Admiral Edwin T. Layton
was skeptical of Brigg's statements. Layton had been the Pacific Fleet's intelligence officer
in 1941. In 1985, Roger Pineau and John Costello completed Layton's book, A nd I Was
There, in which he questioned Toland's conclusions. Briggs claimed to have recorded the
dispatch on December 4, just as Safford had said. Layton pointed out that the duty log
showed Briggs on duty on December 2, not December 4. Layton also argued that without
the actual document, one could not prove the Winds Message was received. However, he
did admit that there was substantial evidence o f the existence o f such a document. Layton
also agreed with Toland that there was evidence that the British and the Dutch picked up
such a signal; he believed as well that pressure was used to have some witnesses change
their testimony.11
Robert William Love, Jr., a professor o f Naval History at the United States Naval
Academy, attacked Toland's conclusions and argued against the existence o f a conspiracy.
He stressed the Japanese denial o f sending a Winds Message prior to the attack.
Furthermore, he supported earlier assertions that even if a Winds Message was
transmitted, received and distributed to military officials, it still only meant a break in
relations, not necessarily war.12
Even more controversial than Toland's information about the Winds Message was his
assertion that the American government tracked the fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor, the
Kido Butai. Toland recorded incidents in which people located the fleet and sent the
information to Washington, but other writers disputed his information. At the center of
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the dispute was Toland's "Seaman Z" who allegedly told Toland that he had picked up the
radio signals o f the Fleet as it crossed the Pacific and located it east o f the International
Date Line.13
After the identification o f "Seaman Z," other writers challenged Toland's argument.
The New York Times reported on December 4th, 1983 that "Seaman Z" had been
identified as Robert D. Ogg and repeated Ogg's claim that the information was sent to the
White House.14 The next spring Telford Taylor, former General Consul to the F.C.C. and
Nuremburg prosecutor, wrote a critical piece about Toland for the Times. Taylor studied
Ogg's statement to Retired Navy Commander I. G. Neuman in which Ogg admitted that
he only spoke with Toland at the request o f Admiral Kimmel's son. Ogg revealed he had
no personal knowledge o f the radio transmissions, only that his superior had told him that
they came from the Japanese fleet. He did not know how the signals had been identified,
thus reflating Toland's claim that he had identified them as carriers. For all Ogg knew, the
signals could have come from fishing boats.15 Taylor also discredited Toland's claim that
Ogg's commander, Captain Richard McCullogh, contacted Roosevelt personally with the
information. Taylor checked with Roosevelt's private secretary who assured him that
McCullough could not have personally contacted the President without her knowledge
and she could not remember the man.16
Alvin Coox, the Director of the Japanese Studies Institute at San Diego State
University, criticized another piece o f Toland's evidence. Toland studied the diary of the
Dutch naval attache to Washington, Captain Johan E. Meijer Ranneft. According to
Toland, the diary showed that Naval Intelligence detected two Japanese carriers heading
toward Pearl Harbor. Coox argued that the diary only noted two carriers heading east
from Japan. There was no word about an attack on Hawaii, but there was an assumption
that the carriers were in position to observe American moves.17
Stanley Weintraub and Gordon Prange approached the issue from another direction.
They argued that the United States could not possibly have detected radio emissions from
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the invading force, because the Japanese did not break radio silence. Weintraub credited
the Japanese with actually removing the transmitting tubes and locking the keys. He
wrote that even the radios o f the aircraft on board the ships were inoperable until just
prior to the attack.18
Prange was the chief civilian historian attached to General MacArthur's headquarters
and had access to Japanese documents and officials. After his death, Donald Goldstein
and Katherine Dillon finished his book, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict o f History. Based on
the diaries o f Japanese officers and reports o f Japanese investigations, Prange argued that
radio silence was maintained. The transmitting keys were actually sealed to prevent
accidental transmissions. Prange contradicted Toland’s charge that a radio officer in San
Francisco picked up the signals. He quoted a former Japanese officer who pointed out the
technical impossibility o f picking up VHF radio signals in San Francisco, four thousand
miles from their source.19
In 1993, Dillon and Goldstein published some of Prange's evidence in Pearl Harbor
Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans. The commanders of a Japanese destroyer and a
Japanese submarine wrote o f the importance of secrecy and that the fleet did not break
radio silence.20 A Japanese study of the operation disclosed that the fuses had been taken
out of the radios and the transmitting keys sealed.21 It also pointed out that when
communication was broken by a submarine on the return trip, the Americans acted
immediately.22
Other information in The Pearl Harbor Papers provided a better understanding o f the
extent of Japanese efforts to maintain secrecy in the planning and execution o f the attack.
Minoru Genda, who drafted the operational plan of attack, related the difficulty in
planning the operation when only a few high ranking naval officers knew the details of the
plan.23 He reported that the men involved could only guess at the target o f the attack for
which they were training and that most did not believe it would be Hawaii.24
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In the 1940's, Americans, believing in Japanese inferiority, were quick to assume that
Japan could not possibly have achieved complete surprise. However, the information
uncovered by Prange, Dillon and Goldstein added to the earlier statements of Togo and
others, showed that the Japanese put tremendous effort into shrouding their plans and
actions. Many of the works of the 1980's and 1990's emphasized the aspect o f Japanese
secrecy. In contrast to earlier writers, the majority o f writers in recent decades believe
that Roosevelt neither had information o f the Japanese Fleet nor had learned of the attack
through Magic. They moved away from the old revisionist theories.

A Different Conspiracy
James Rusbridger and Eric Nave agreed that the Kido Butai maintained radio silence
and that decrypts o f the diplomatic traffic gave no warning o f the attack. They argued
that the conspiracy theories involving the President were illogical and lacked proof
However, the author's did believe that the Japanese revealed their plans and that both the
British including Winston Churchill and some members of the United States Navy knew it.
In Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II,
Rusbridger and Nave argued that both the British and the American navies had broken the
Japanese Naval Code, JN-25, and thus decoded the final commands from Tokyo to the
Japanese Fleet.
Eric Nave was an Australian cryptologist who broke the JN-25 code for the British.
He claimed that the British were reading the messages from Tokyo to their ships from
1939 onward.25 Thus, the British read Isoruku Yamamoto's message to the Kido Butai to
depart on November 26th and arrive at the refueling point by December fourth. Nave said
that he and the other British intelligence officers figured that Pearl Harbor was the only
possible target for this action.26 The authors said that if Churchill told Roosevelt about
this message, it would explain the President's abandonment of the M odus Vivendi in late
November. However, they argued that Churchill never told Roosevelt in order to keep
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the President from warning Hawaii and thus ensuring American entry into the war.27
Nave said that the British also intercepted the message from Yamamoto that gave the date
o f the attack 28
Like previous conspiracy writers, Rusbridger and Nave could not produce proof of
Churchill's actions but relied on circumstantial evidence. They had Nave’s recollections
that the British intercepted the messages and sent the information to Churchill. They also
highlighted suspicious actions by the British government. It would not release the JN-25
decrypts and had refused to allow its intelligence officers to testify at the Congressional
hearings.29
Rusbridger and Nave also believed but could not prove that the United States Navy
intercepted the same messages and decoded them. They pointed to four primary sources
that revealed that some JN-25 messages were read between June, 1939 and Pearl Harbor.
However, in their search for these messages, they were told by the U.S. Naval Security
Group that the messages could not be located. The authors argued that the Navy had
decoded Yamamoto's commands to the fleet but concealed the information after Pearl
Harbor after realizing that they had failed to correctly interpret the information.
Rusbridger and Nave blamed Admiral Richmond Turner for not getting the information to
the President and for orchestrating the cover-up.30
After the publication o f Betrayal at Pearl Harbor in 1991, more information surfaced
that gave support to the allegations in the book. In the preface o f the second edition in
1992, Rusbridger and Nave noted that the wife of Commander Malcolm Burnett of the
British Navy, insisted that her husband had personally advised Churchill that the Japanese
force was heading toward Pearl Harbor.31 They also wrote that on December 8, 1991 the
National Security Agency admitted for the first time that both British and American
codebreakers had broken the JN-25 code prior to Pearl Harbor.32 The New York Times
reported in August o f 1991 that the British Ministry o f Defense had tried to convince
Nave not to cooperate with Rusbridger and put pressure on the publishers.33
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More Debate About Admiral Kimmel
One subject that Rusbridger and Nave did not cover was the responsibilities of the
Hawaiian commanders, but others continued this aspect o f the debate. As in the 1940's
and 1950's, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel continued to be part of the controversy in the
1980's and 1990's. Admiral Layton for years buried his anger over what he felt was an
injustice done to Admiral Kimmel. With the release of top secret documents from the
National Archives, he decided to tell his side o f the story. Exonerating Kimmel, Layton
placed the blame on "internal feuding in the Naval Department that limited Washington's
ability to evaluate and disseminate intelligence."34 In particular, Layton blamed Admiral
Richmond K. Turner for taking over the responsibility of disseminating intelligence and
then not getting the information to Kimmel. Vice Admiral David C. Richardson
supported this assessment, denouncing the turf battle between the Naval Intelligence,
Naval Communications and Naval War Plans Divisions over the responsibility to distribute
intelligence.35
Henry Clausen's book, Pearl Harbor: F inal Judgement, charged Turner with
culpability but also attributed liability to Kimmel and Layton as well. Clausen conducted
the Clausen Investigation during World War II. Henry Stimson assigned him to further
investigate the conclusions o f the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Clausen traveled around
the world interviewing 92 people.36 His 1992 book put the chief blame on Kimmel and
General Short for failing to provide each other with information and to prepare Pearl
Harbor for attack.37 He derided Layton for not informing the Army o f the war warning.
He also charged Turner with causing problems by trying to take over the Navy
Department and insisting on interpreting the intellingence.38
The main point of Final Judgement was not assessing individual blame but to look at
what Clausen considered the real problem. He insisted that the reason for Pearl Harbor
was that the system failed. Describing the problems of split commands, lack of integration
of the intelligence services, lack o f understanding of the importance o f intelligence and
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lack o f communication, he argued that the main lesson of Pearl Harbor was that the
system needed to be fixed, so that individuals would not fail as easily.39
Edward L. Beach, in Scapegoats: A Defense o f Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor,
directed the blame back to the administration. Beach labeled himself a "second-class
revisionist" in the book, meaning that he believed that Roosevelt wanted to get the United
States into the war, but did not believe that Roosevelt had knowledge o f the Japanese
intentions to bomb Pearl Harbor. Beach claimed, without proof, that Roosevelt met with
his chief advisors on the eve of the attack. He asserted that Roosevelt and his advisors
guessed that there would be an attack, but underestimated the capability of the Japanese
and did not realize that the attack would come at Pearl Harbor. Beach blamed Roosevelt
for failing to correctly interpret the information and then using Kimmel and Short as
scapegoats to cover up the mistakes made in Washington. Beach did not claim that there
was a major conspiracy, only that mistakes were made and the wrong people were blamed
for those mistakes.

Overconfidence
Many other writers o f the past decade focused on broader explanations for the Pearl
Harbor disaster. Like Beach, many argued that overconfidence and mistakes caused the
debacle. Major Claude Sasso wrote in 1983 that the overconfidence o f U.S. military and
civilian authorities in both Pearl Harbor and Washington led them to underestimate the
Japanese capabilities. This in turn allowed them to miss the warnings they had.40
Thurston Clark's 1991 book Pearl Harbor Ghosts: A Journey to Pearl Harbor Then and
Now expanded on this issue. He cited reports in newspapers that called the U.S. Navy the
greatest in the world, speeches in Congress portraying America's superiority over Japan
and jingoist accounts of Hawaii's impregnability. According to Clark, the prevailing
attitude at the time was that a Japanese attack on Hawaii was a big joke.41 Weintraub
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reported that Kimmel told a newspaper reporter on December 6, that the Japanese would
not risk a war with the United States.42
Another piece in Pearl Harbor Papers revealed that the Japanese may have suffered
from the same problem. This was essay written after the war by Musutaka Chihaya in
which he critized the plan to attack Hawaii. He blamed the Japanese for overestimating
their abilities as fighters and convincing themselves that Americans were weak and lazy.43
He criticized the Japanese Army for not studying the American Army and denounced the
Japanese Navy for imagining it could win the war in one decisive victory.44 He argued
that if the Japanese had not held this false confidence and had actually studied America,
they would have avoided war.
Seth Feldman combined both the American and Japanese faults in a 1992 article.
Feldman accused each side o f being racially motivated. He argued that because of racial
stereotypes, the two adversaries did not understand each other. The belief o f both sides in
their own superiority hampered negotiations. Feldman extended his point to the nineties,
arguing that both sides continued to misread each other, which allowed for the danger o f a
misunderstanding.45

Conclusion
As happened in earlier decades the controversy flourished in the 1980’s and 1990's,
because new information evoked support, challenges and doubts. Toland, Rusbridger
and Nave took the same basic approach as previous revisionists did. They combined
witnesses, questions about missing evidence and titillating explanations o f what might
have occurred to create a believable argument. Other writers challenged much o f Toland's
argument and successfully attacked his evidence but only by studying it extensively and
bringing forth more information. Rusbridger and Nave's assertions were more difficult to
discredit. They made a convincing claim that the evidence to support their argument

was either destroyed by the British and American governments or kept classified. They
created doubt about the official statements. Rusbridger and Nave could not prove their
theory without the information; yet, as long as people believe that either the evidence may
exist or may have existed, their theory will not be totally discredited.
One interesting facet of the controversy in recent years was the absence o f political
motives. Historians, political scientists, former intelligence officers, and others debated
the topic. Congress had other scandals to investigate. Even those who supported
conspiracy theories did so without the larger implications of an attack on interventionism.
The politics were gone. The fight continued because the history had not been resolved.
The most important effect o f the renewal o f the Pearl Harbor debate over the past
twelve years was that it allowed for more information and a better understanding o f what
happened. The accusations and counter charges extended the interest in the event. This
provoked the participants to come forth and tell their stories and the researchers to delve
deeper and write more books and articles. Although writers in the eighties and nineties
did not produce a work that closed the debate once and for all, they did provide a better
understanding of what happened before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. From the
American side to the Japanese side, from Washington to Hawaii, from the covert to the
overt, recent works revealed that there was still more to tell.

CONCLUSION

Without the doubters; the revisionists, the isolationists, the Congressional Republicans,
those pushing agendas and those seeking the truth; without the challenges to the official
record of what happened at Pearl Harbor, there would not have been a controversy.
These people made the charges that forced further investigation either in defense o f the
administration or in the attempt to prove various revisionist arguments. In the immediate
aftermath o f the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American people rallied behind the President.
Those who did not believe or support the President were seen as disloyal; yet, some
continued to doubt and to search. The critics pursued the story, pushing for more
Information about what had happened. Their actions resulted in various official
investigations, the release o f more data and reams o f sometimes questionable testimony.
The doubts were supposed to end with the conclusions of the Congressional Investigation,
but post-war revisionists and more recent writers have maintained their questions and the
pressure to "uncover" the "true" story. They have succeeded not in answering the
questions but in fostering a controversy that may never be settled. Although there has
never been closure to the debate, the controversy has resulted in a plethora of information
about which opinions can be made.
The heart o f the revisionist argument was that Roosevelt wanted war with Japan. In
the least, the revisionists showed that Roosevelt did not do everything within his power to
avoid war with Japan. Members o f the administration explained at various times that the
administration had wanted to refrain from conflict with Japan and the possibility o f a
two front war. However, it seems likely that the desire to get into the war with Germany
outweighed this. Roosevelt had been helping the British by trading destroyers for bases,
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lend-lease and support for the convoys, but the British needed more assistance.
Roosevelt, hampered by his campaign promise to keep America out of "foreign wars,"
could not initiate the war with Germany but wanted to get into it.
Morgenstem claimed that Roosevelt wanted to the get America into the war for
egocentric motives: a place in history and control over the nation. Although this criticism
was unfounded, Roosevelt's actions showed that he did want war with Germany. In the
fall o f 1941, the Navy was pushing a confrontation with the Germans, but Hitler refused to
take the bait. Another way to become involved was through a war with Japan. In the
summer and fall o f 1941, the option of war with Japan, Germany's ally, was certainly
becoming more likely. The United States cut off oil to Japan and demanded a cessation of
Japanese aggression. The pressure mounted into late November of 1941. Due to British
secrecy, it is still unknown what Churchill told Roosevelt in his November 25th note.
Perhaps he put more pressure on Roosevelt to enter the war. The following day
Roosevelt rejected the "modus viviendi" and had Cordell Hull present the plan that
the Japanese would later call an ultimatum. Many have argued that it was not an
ultimatum, but Roosevelt's diplomacy called for Japan to make concessions it was unlikely
to make. Roosevelt did not start the war with Japan; however, his insistence on the hard
line in the face o f Japanese goals provided little hope for a diplomatic resolution to the
problem. By late November, 1941 the administration certainly knew that war with Japan
was imminent, and it waited for Japan to make a move
Roosevelt had to know that war was coming. However, the real controversy is
whether or not he knew the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and allowed it to happen
or possibly manipulated events to make sure that it happened. Critics claimed that
Roosevelt set up the fleet as a target, knew the Japanese were going to attack it and knew
the location o f the attacking force. They claimed that he kept the Hawaiian commanders
from preparing for the attack in order to achieve the devastation necessary to shock the
nation into the war. Despite tremendous efforts, these allegations were never proven.
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It was ridiculous to assume that Roosevelt engineered the attack. The Japanese
planned the operation for close to a year. Roosevelt wanted war and refused to appease
Japanese aggression, but he was incapable of manipulating Japanese plans. He also did
not know the details o f these plans.
On the morning o f December 7th, Roosevelt and his advisors did suspect that the
Japanese were, in the words of Henry Stimson, "up to some devilry." They knew of
Japan's negative and caustic reply to their proposal and when its reply would be delivered
to the American government. They also knew the Japanese were burning documents at
their embassy in Washington and Japan's history of surprise attacks. With the "bomb plot
messages" American intelligence even had ample information to suspect an attack on Pearl
Harbor. However, as Roberta Wohlstetter argued, ample intelligence did not mean that
the data had been properly analyzed and disseminated. The administration misread the
dangers, expecting the attacks on the Philippines and Indo-China. In simple terms, the
government was caught looking in the wrong direction.
Roosevelt's critics could not prove the accusations to the contrary. Their claims that
Magic pinpointed the Japanese plans were wrong, regardless o f what they tried to
read into the intercepted messages with hindsight. The Japanese foreign minister, the man
sending the messages, claimed not to have known, and it would be ridiculous to suggest
that he was part of the conspiracy. John Toland made the best argument that the United
States tracked the Kido Butai, but he could not prove it. Japanese documentation insisted
that the fleet maintained its secrecy. Nobody has ever produced the supposedly
incriminating JN-25 messages or the Winds Execute. In any case, the latter would have
been irrelevant as American intelligence already knew, through the Japanese reply, that
Japan had decided to break off diplomatic relations. Roosevelt did not know that the
Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor.
Saying that Roosevelt did not know o f the attack did not absolve the administration o f
any blame in the debacle. The administration made mistakes. They failed to communicate
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effectively. The President did not tell the American people or the Congress exactly what
the situation was. This may have been good for getting involved in the war with
Germany, but it was not honest. If honesty is what the American people expected of their
leaders, they were let down.
The administration was guilty of other failures of communication. The strangely
worded war warnings o f late November and the neglect to send additional messages based
on new information did not prove that the administration purposefully set up the disaster
at Pearl Harbor. However, they are the administration’s fault. It failed to see to its
obligations. The war warnings sent to Hawaii in late November were inadequate.
Regardless of their intent, the warnings were ambiguous enough to confuse two able
commanders. Some of the blame should fall on General Short and Admiral Kimmel who
could have spoken more to each other and left less to assumption. At the same time,
those who sent the messages should have acknowledged that as additional data
accumulated and the situation grew worse, they needed to keep the field commanders
abreast o f the situation.
At least the administration should have sent another warning on the morning o f the
seventh. Admiral Stark had hours to do so. He was at fault for not acting immediately
and alerting the Hawaiian commanders. By not being in his office on the morning o f
December 7th, at a time when intelligence demonstrated that something critical was about
to happen, by not using the scrambler phone to call General Short, Marshall failed to get
the warning to Hawaii on time. Whether an additional warning, received a few hours
before the attack would have made a significant difference in the outcome was irrelevant;
leaders in Washington could have done more to prepare the defenses but did not.
In not foreseeing the attack and effectively communicating the situation to the
commanders in Hawaii, the administration failed. However, this was a failure o f the
administration not the actions of a conspiracy. Blame or more accurately credit for the
success of the attack is due to the brilliance and daring o f the Japanese military as well
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as its ability to maintain secrecy and carry out the operation. On the other hand, too much
emphasis on secrecy hurt the United States. The military was so concerned with
maintaining the secrecy o f Magic that it did not effectively utilize the information which
Magic provided. The administration also underestimated Japanese capabilities. The
disaster at Pearl Harbor occurred because o f American mistakes and Japanese success.
The administration did not initiate the disaster but it did fail to own up to its mistakes
which did foster the ensuing controversy.
It is the controversy itself which is the main point of this work. None o f the preceding
conclusions offer any startling new evidence that will settle the controversy once and for
all, but that is not the point. The emphasis o f this paper is that, after reading through the
reports o f the official investigations, the testimonies and private papers of those involved
and numerous works on the subject, one cannot find any proof o f a conspiracy, yet the
controversy still exists. After all the investigations and findings, the issue will not go
away.
The controversy developed and grew because of a failure on the part of the
administration to admit its mistakes; a need to protect precious sources o f intelligence;
politics; and the public's desire to know the truth. In not admitting its mistakes, the
administration struggled with a common dilemma involved with secret information.
Although rumors surfaced about the administration's prior knowledge, to preserve its
secrets, the administration had to deny, had to lie. They could not quell the rumors with
the truth, so the rumors grew, and the administration appeared devious. When the truth o f
the denials was revealed after the war, it only fed the fires of the administration's critics.
Revisionists insisted there was more to be revealed and convinced many people that they
were right.
This would continue to have an effect on the actions o f future presidents and the
public's views of their government in the post-war period. Presidents did not always tell
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Congress or the public everything. They hid behind the veil of national security secrets,
sometimes abusing this veil. In the case o f Pearl Harbor, the government had a legitimate
reason to withhold certain information, particularly information pertaining to its codebreaking activities. However, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. pointed out in The Imperial
Presidency, later presidents manipulated the secrecy system to prevent Congress from
checking its powers in foreign affairs. Those presidents learned to use the Pearl Harbor
example to further their agendas, but this only eroded the people's trust in the American
government.1
O f course, politics had a large impact on the controversy. It was the Republicans in
Congress, looking for a weakness to exploit, who kept the issue alive. In speeches
Congressional Republicans speculated about American code-breaking activities.
Republicans called for additional investigations and put hard questions to administration
officials who testified. It was Owen Brewster and Homer Ferguson, Congressional
Republicans, who clouded the report of the Joint Congressional Committee by issuing
their own minority views. Other Republicans called for a second Congressional
Investigation. Their motives were clear. They hoped to reveal information which would
damage the popularity of Roosevelt and the Democrats and allow them to gain control
over the government.
In addition to and part o f the Republican-Democrat struggle, there was the struggle
over American foreign policy. Many of the post-war revisionists hoped to utilize the
controversy as a forum to rebuke Roosevelt's internationalist dreams and push the nation's
course back to one o f isolationism. Charles Beard, Henry Elmer Barnes and others
formed many of the most convincing arguments about Roosevelt's "Pearl Harbor
Conspiracy" in the efforts to change American foreign policy. They did not achieve their
goals, but they did stimulate the controversy over Pearl Harbor.
In the post-watergate years, it was not politics that fueled the works on Pearl Harbor
but a determination to learn the truth. If anything, distrust in the government was higher
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in recent years than ever before. This distrust in government, not the isolationist debate,
kept the controversy alive until more information was released. New information in recent
years gave rise to more suspicions and desire to know the truth. Ralph Briggs
corroborated Safford's testimony three decades after the Congressional hearings.
Robert Ogg claimed that the United States had tracked the Kido Butai. Eric Nave said the
British intercepted Yamamoto's orders to the fleet. This and other information nourished
the dispute.
The controversy began and continues, because people believed and still believe that
information that would prove the conspiracy theories has been withheld. Unless there is
information proving the conspiracy in the millions o f secret documents recently released
by the Clinton administration, the controversy will continue. The lesson is clear. When
the American government withholds information from the public and attempts to hide its
failures, it will always remain suspect and open to charges o f wrongful actions. Its name
may never be cleared.
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